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Jason MacLean*

Transnational Corporations and Climate
Governance: A Case Study of
Amazon.com’s Net-Zero Climate Pledge

“Net zero” has become the predominant way of framing global, national, and
nonstate climate change commitments. Hundreds of countries and thousands of
corporations promise to achieve net-zero emissions by 2050 or earlier. Hopeful
as this may seem, early evidence suggests the need to carefully scrutinize
corporations’ climate promises. Specifically, there is an urgent need to critically
assess the claim that strategic collaboration and compromise at the sciencebusiness-society interface can deliver the transformative social, economic, and
political change required to address climate change.
Analyzing Amazon.com’s net-zero pledge as a case study, this article argues that
strategic conflict with—and within—transnational corporations is a necessary
precondition of transformative climate governance. This article also suggests
that such conflict may ultimately prove insufficient. The very modus operandi of
transnational corporations—and the prospect of perpetual economic growth—may
be fundamentally irreconcilable with the maintenance of stable and sustainable
planetary boundaries.
Le concept de « zéro émission nette » est devenu la manière prédominante de
formuler les engagements mondiaux, nationaux et non étatiques en matière
de changement climatique. Des centaines de pays et des milliers d’entreprises
promettent d’atteindre des émissions nettes nulles d’ici 2050 ou avant. Aussi
prometteur que cela puisse paraître, les premières indications laissent entendre
qu’il est nécessaire d’examiner attentivement les promesses des entreprises
en matière climatique. Plus précisément, il est urgent d’évaluer de manière
critique l’affirmation selon laquelle la collaboration stratégique et les compromis
entre science-entreprise-société peuvent apporter les changements sociaux,
économiques et politiques nécessaires pour faire face aux changements
climatiques.
En analysant l’engagement de zéro émission nette d’Amazon.com comme une
étude de cas, cet article soutient que le conflit stratégique avec—et au sein
des entreprises transnationales—est une condition préalable nécessaire à la
transformation de la gouvernance climatique. Cet article suggère également qu’un
tel conflit pourrait en fin de compte s’avérer insuffisant. Le modus operandi même
des sociétés transnationales—et la perspective d’une croissance économique
perpétuelle—pourrait être fondamentalement inconciliable avec le maintien de
frontières planétaires stables et durables.
*
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Conclusion

The global dominance of TNCs is a reality of the Anthropocene, when
transformative change is urgently needed.1
…the challenge is to avoid the tendency, too common in environmental
social science today, to argue why positive change is unlikely or even
impossible, without falling into simplistic cheerleading.2

Introduction
Transnational corporations are increasingly implicated, not only in the
causes of and the proposed solutions to climate change, but also climate
change’s competing characterizations.3 At the time of writing, more
1.
Carl Folke et al, “Transnational Corporations and the Challenge of Biosphere Stewardship”
(2019) 3:10 Nature Ecology & Evolution 1396 at 1401, DOI: <10.1038/s41559-019-0978-z> [Folke
et al, “Transnational Corporations”]. Folke and his colleagues observe, for example, that 70 per cent
of global GHG emissions can be attributed to 100 companies, which are primarily comprised of
transnational corporations along with state-owned monopolies producing oil, gas, and coal.
2.
J Timmons Roberts, “Commentary: Challenges and Opportunities for Global Environmental
Governance in the 21st century” (2008) 18:3 Global Environmental Change 375 at 375, DOI:
<10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2008.07.001>.
3.
See e.g. Melissa Aronczyk & Maria I Espinoza, A Strategic Nature: Public Relations and the
Politics of American Environmentalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2022).
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than 1,500 corporations have announced voluntary net-zero greenhouse
gas (GHG) emissions targets; one in five corporations included in the
Forbes Global 2000 ranking have set a net-zero target for the year 2050
or earlier.4 Impressive as this may seem, early evidence suggests the
urgent need to more critically evaluate corporations’ climate promises.5
More specifically, there is an urgent need to critically assess the claim that
strategic collaboration and compromise at the science-business-society
interface is capable of delivering the transformative social, economic,
and political change required to mitigate6 and adapt7 to climate change.
Drawing on Amazon.com’s net-zero climate pledge as a case study,8 I will
argue that strategic conflict with—and within—transnational corporations
is a necessary precondition of transformative climate mitigation and
adaptation. I will also suggest, however, that such conflict may ultimately
prove insufficient, even inevitably so. Indeed, it may be that the very modus
operandi of transnational corporations—and the prospect of perpetual
economic growth—is irreconcilable with the maintenance of stable and
sustainable planetary boundaries.
I will proceed as follows. In the first part of the article, I discuss
climate change as a super wicked problem, including the implications
of that characterization for climate governance and climate governance
scholarship—specifically, the climate-governance case for prioritizing
strategic conflict over multistakeholder collaboration and compromise. In
the next part of the article I describe the nonstate-actor turn in climate
4.
Sam Fankhauser et al, “The Meaning of Net Zero and How to Get It Right” (2022) 12:1 Nature
Climate Change 15 at 17, DOI: <10.1038/s41558-021-01245-w>.
5.
See e.g. Jeff Tollefson, “Climate pledges from top companies crumble under scrutiny,”
Nature (last modified 9 February 2022), online: <www.nature.com/articles/d41586-02200366-2> [perma.cc/6W44-G9PZ]. For the underlying analysis on which Tollefson’s report is
based, see Thomas Day et al, “Corporate Climate Responsibility Monitor 2022: Assessing the
Transparency and Integrity of Companies’ Emission Reduction and Net-Zero Targets” (February
2022), online (pdf): New Climate Institute <newclimate.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/
CorporateClimateResponsibilityMonitor2022.pdf> [perma.cc/2T4C-F9XC].
6.
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, “Global Warming of 1.5ºC: Summary
for Policymakers” (6 October 2018), online (pdf): IPCC <www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/
sites/2/2022/06/SPM_version_report_LR.pdf> [perma.cc/4LUE-C7F7].
7.
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, “Climate Change 2022: Impacts, Adaptation
and Vulnerability: Summary for Policymakers” (27 February 2022), online (pdf): <report.ipcc.ch/
ar6wg2/pdf/IPCC_AR6_WGII_SummaryForPolicymakers.pdf> [perma.cc/VF23-AQAT].
8.
I will also canvass the climate commitments of several other transnational corporations, including
BlackRock, Google, Microsoft, and ExxonMobil, both to set the stage for and to complement my indepth critical analysis of Amazon’s climate commitments. For an excellent investigative analysis of
Amazon’s net-zero climate pledge, see Will Evans, “Private Report Shows How Amazon Drastically
Undercounts Its Carbon Footprint,” Reveal (25 February 2022), online: <revealnews.org/article/
private-report-shows-how-amazon-drastically-undercounts-its-carbon-footprint/> [perma.cc/JDF9K76G].
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governance research. The nonstate-actor turn is both embedded in and
a consequence of the architecture of the UN Paris Agreement, and it is
crucial to understanding the emergence of transnational corporations as
key climate actors. From there I proceed to critically examine the recent
and notable proposal of corporate biosphere stewardship. The corporate
biosphere stewardship proposal is representative of the presently
predominant approach to climate governance; its primary importance is the
way it throws into relief the ostensibly compelling rationale underlying—
but largely implicit in—several other science-business-society initiatives.
I argue that the evidentiary and conceptual limitations of the corporate
biosphere stewardship proposal, which I draw out from multiple sources
of evidence, further complicate climate change’s already super wicked
complexity. I then seek to bring together the lessons from the examination
of the corporate biosphere stewardship proposal in the broader context
of environmental governance to bear on a case study of the Amazon
Employees for Climate Justice’s strategic opposition to Amazon.com’s
net-zero climate pledge. I argue that the Amazon employees’ advocacy
supports the prioritization of strategic conflict but also fundamentally calls
into question the potentially irreconcilable incompatibility of transnational
corporate business models—even net-zero emissions models—and the
maintenance of stable and sustainable planetary boundaries.
I. Climate change as a super wicked problem—the need for conflict
To understand the conceptual move from collaboration and compromise
to strategic conflict, climate change must first be properly understood—
and responded to—as a super wicked governance problem.9 Super wicked
governance problems have four defining features: (1) the time to solve
the problem is running out, (2) those responsible for the problem (e.g.
transnational corporations) also seek to solve it, (3) there is no central
authority capable of addressing the problem, and (4) the problem tends
to yield delayed and irrational responses.10 Super wicked problems result
in a tragedy of the commons because our governance and policymaking
institutions are geared toward short-term time horizons11 and private,
rather than public, interests.12
9.
Kelly Levin et al, “Overcoming the Tragedy of Super Wicked Problems: Constraining Our Future
Selves to Ameliorate Global Climate Change” (2012) 45:2 Policy Sciences 123, DOI: <10.1007/
s11077-012-9151-0>. See also Richard J Lazarus, “Super Wicked Problems and Climate Change:
Restraining the Present to Liberate the Future” (2009) 94:5 Cornell L Rev1153 at 1159-1161, online:
<scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr/vol94/iss5/8/> [perma.cc/9FKA- JYAV].
10. Levin et al, supra note 9 at 124.
11. Ibid.
12. See e.g. Bruce Campbell, ed, Corporate Rules: The Real World of Business Regulation in
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The conceptualization of climate change as a super wicked policy
problem builds on the earlier and influential characterization of wicked
policy problems, problems for which there are no simple and straightforward
solutions.13 While many if not most public policy problems are probably
wicked,14 there is an additional defining feature of wicked problems that
makes climate change a super wicked problem: climate change presents
as not only an intractable problem, but also an interpretive one.15 There
are multiple ways of interpreting climate change as a problem, and each
of those interpretations influences the development of proposed solutions.
Means and ends are interdependent, adding additional complexity to the
policy problem posed by climate change. For wicked and super wicked
problems alike, different actors having different interests disagree about
how to define and isolate the relevant dimensions of the problem to be
solved, which in turn leads to disagreements over optimal solutions.16 Even
the framing of climate change as a “problem” capable of being “solved” is
complicated and controversial.17
Kelly Levin and her colleagues’ definition of super wicked problems—
including climate change—illustrates this interpretative interdependency:
The challenge, we argue, is not a lack of interest to address super
wicked problems. Rather, it is to counteract the tendency of our political
institutions, as reinforced by our individual tendencies as consumers and
voters, to make decisions that give greater weight to immediate interests
and to delay required behavioral changes, even when doing so is clearly
contrary to our long-term interests.18

This particular—and highly technocratic—interpretation of “the
challenge” leads to Levin and her colleagues’ preoccupation with general
features of environmental policy design and governance capable of
overcoming our tragic tendency to act against our long-term interests.
In respect of each of three key policy design features that Levin and
her colleagues describe (i.e. stickiness, incremental entrenchment, and
expanding coverage), the interest of policymakers and institutional
decisionmakers to entertain and explore policy options of these kinds
Canada (Toronto: James Lorimer & Company Ltd., Publishers, 2022).
13. Horst WJ Rittel & Melvin M Webber, “Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning” (1973) 4:2
Policy Sciences 155, DOI: <10.1007/BF01405730>.
14. Levin et al, supra note 9 at 126.
15. Dror Etzion, “Management for Sustainability” (2018) 1:12 Nature Sustainability 744 at 745,
DOI: <10.1038/s41893-018-0184-z>.
16. See e.g. Mike Hulme, Why We Disagree About Climate Change: Understanding Controversy,
Inaction and Opportunity (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2009).
17. Ibid.
18. Levin et al, supra note 9 at 125.
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in the first place is uncritically presupposed. As I will argue below and
throughout this article, the normative and institutional pre-commitment to
undertake transformative, science-based climate action cannot simply be
taken for granted. That normative precommitment is far less common, far
less genuine, than Levin and her colleagues suppose.
Moreover, Levin and her colleagues’ interpretation of the challenge
of super wicked problems as a challenge of technocratic policy design
leads to their promotion of collaborative approaches to policymaking.
By way of a brief illustration, they cite the implementation in 2008 of a
carbon tax in British Columbia of CDN$10 per tonne of carbon dioxide
equivalent (CO2e). On their reading of BC’s carbon tax policy, the BC
Liberal government “took advantage of its strong ties with business
interests by developing a revenue neutral tax policy, which fostered
swift entrenchment through increasing returns by benefiting a core
constituency.”19 They further argue that the BC Liberal government’s
“strong ties to business arguably paved the way for such coalition
building.”20 The BC carbon tax policy, they conclude, “illustrates additional
strategies for fostering a coalition of support” for rational public policy
instruments.21
In 2013, however, one year following the publication of Levin and
her colleagues’ influential article, the same BC Liberal government (albeit
under a different leader) froze the carbon tax at its 2012 level instead of
incrementally increasing it as originally planned.22 The BC carbon tax
had been—and continues to be—criticized repeatedly and vigorously
by the BC Business Council. The BC Business Council suggested, for
example, that the observed reduction in fuel consumption following the
implementation of the carbon tax was due, not to the tax, but to an increase
in cross-border shopping in Alberta and Washington State.23 The Business
Council also expressed the concern of its members that as a small trading
economy, British Columbia competes with jurisdictions that have not
implemented similarly stringent climate policies, and that the carbon tax
placed a number of the province’s energy-intensive and trade-exposed

19. Ibid at 142.
20. Ibid at 142, n 15.
21. Ibid at 142.
22. See Kathryn Harrison, “Lessons from British Columbia’s carbon tax,” Policy Options (11 July
2019), online: <policyoptions.irpp.org/magazines/july-2019/lessons-from-british-columbias-carbontax/> [perma.cc/82GZ-384W].
23. See e.g. Jock Finlayson, “B.C.’s carbon tax hurting businesses,” Vancouver Sun (1 August 2013),
online: <vancouversun.com/business/2035/bcs-carbon-tax-hurting-businesses?r> [perma.cc/W8N8G2DK].
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businesses at a disadvantage in the global marketplace.24 The carbon tax
remained frozen until British Columbia elected a new government, formed
in 2017 by a coalition of the New Democratic Party and the Green Party.25
The collaborative, coalition-based approach to policy design urged
by Levin and her colleagues did not result in a sticky, incrementally
entrenched, and expanded policy in the case of the BC carbon tax. The
lesson of the BC carbon tax, rather, is that putative business lobby support
of climate policy proposals must be scrutinized closely and critically,26
and that multistakeholder coalition-building may not be enough to enact
durable, rational, and science-based climate policies.
On the contrary, attempts at multistakeholder collaboration and
compromise may effectively undermine rational climate policy, calling for
a new approach to the super wicked complexity of climate change. This
is the more recent conclusion of two of Levin’s original co-authors and
highly influential environmental policy and governance scholars in their
own right, Benjamin Cashore and Steven Bernstein. Cashore and Bernstein
propose a novel heuristic typology of environmental governance problemsolution complexes as a response to the super wickedness of climate
change. For Cashore and Bernstein, environmental governance approaches
include the following four broad problem-solution complexes: (1) local,
collective, and context-dependent; (2) universal market-based mechanisms
that optimize costs and benefits; (3) multistakeholder collaboration and
compromise; and (4) the prioritization of super wicked problems (see
Fig. 1, below). These four governance types are further subdivided by
whether (1) proposed solutions follow from problem definitions, and (2)
perceptions of economic utility and efficiency predominate.27
24. See e.g. Linda Givetash, “B.C. keeps freeze on carbon tax in new climate plan,” CTV News
(19 August 2016), online: <www.ctvnews.ca/politics/b-c-keeps-freeze-on-carbon-tax-in-new-climateplan-1.3036057> [perma.cc/GL56-C9GP]. See also Harrison, supra note 21.
25. Harrison, supra note 22.
26. A more recent example comes from Canada’s banking sector. While Canada’s five largest banks
publicly express strong support for climate action and sustainability policies, they are also increasing
their lending to fossil fuel companies. Over the period 2014–2019, which includes the first four years
following the adoption of the Paris Agreement, Canada’s six largest banks increased their lending
to fossil fuel companies by 59 per cent to CDN$58.8 billion. Bank of Montreal CEO Darryl White
rationalized the bank’s increasing support of fossil fuel companies in language that perfectly illustrates
the irrationality produced by super wicked policy problems. According to White, “[i]t’s all about
supporting leaders who want to transition over time—and it does take time, and it will take time—to
a lower-carbon economy”: Doug Alexander & Kevin Orland, “Canadian Banks Going Green Still
Boost Loans to the Oil Industry,” Bloomberg (12 February 2020), online: <www.bloomberg.com/
news/articles/2020-02-12/canadian-banks-going-green-still-boost-loans-to-the-oil-industry> [perma.
cc/4LH3-KSN4].
27. Benjamin Cashore & Steven Bernstein, “Bringing the Environment Back In: Overcoming the
Tragedy of the Diffusion of the Commons Metaphor” (4 February 2022) Perspectives on Politics,
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Fig. 1. Environmental governance problem-solution complexes28
Perceptions of economic utility and efficiency predominate

Solutions follow from Yes
problem definitions

No

Yes

No

Collective & Context-Bound
Common-Pool Resources
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Prioritization
of Super Wicked
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(Type 4)

Universal Market-Based
Cost-Benefit Optimization
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Multistakeholder
Collaboration &
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(Type 3)

Type 1 problem-solution complexes derive from the influential work of
Elinor Ostrom on common-pool resources where individuals irrationally
overharvest resources, resulting in depletion and collapse, the famous
“tragedy of the commons” scenario.29 But as Cashore and Bernstein
observe, “ecosystems are almost always degraded in some way by
successful Type 1 solutions and institutions.”30
Type 2 problem-solution complexes effectively seek to universalize the
institutional economics of Ostrom in the form of market-based cost-benefit
optimizations (e.g. carbon pricing as the preferred and exclusive means of
reducing GHG emissions).31 Cashore and Bernstein note, however, that
DOI: <10.1017/S1537592721002553> [Cashore & Bernstein, “Bringing the Environment Back In”].
Earlier, Cashore and Bernstein applied this heuristic typology to the management of the COVID-19
outbreak: Benjamin Cashore & Steven Bernstein, “Why Experts Disagree on How to Manage
COVID-19: Four Problem Conceptions, Not One” (7 April 2020), online (blog): Global Policy Journal
<www.globalpolicyjournal.com/blog/07/04/2020/why-experts-disagree-how-manage-covid-19four-problem-conceptions-not-one> [perma.cc/AW4K-7RW3]. Cashore emphasized the provisional
and potentially controversial nature of this proposed heuristic typology in a 2019 presentation:
Benjamin Cashore, “Policy Interventions for Type 4 Environmental Problems: Incorporating Power
and Anticipatory Policy Design for Solving the Super Wicked Problem of Climate Change” (Paper
delivered at the Fourth International Conference on Public Policy, Montreal, Quebec, 26 June 2019)
[unpublished] [Cashore, “Type 4 Environmental Problems”].
28. Adapted from Cashore & Bernstein, “Bringing the Environment Back In,” supra note 27 at 7.
29. See Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), especially ch 1.
30. Cashore & Bernstein, “Bringing the Environment Back In,” supra note 27 at 4.
31. See Mark Jaccard, The Citizen’s Guide to Climate Success: Overcoming Myths That Hinder
Progress (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2020), ch 6. For an example of this approach,
see Christopher Ragan & Andrew Potter, “Engineering a ‘green recovery’ is a terrible idea,” The
Globe and Mail (31 May 2020), online: <www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/article-engineeringa-green-recovery-is-a-terrible-idea/> [perma.cc/ZS65-XCRQ]. Ragan and Potter assert that “[t]he
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Type 2 approaches encourage continually increasing economic growth,
industrialization, and consumption, which in turn further stress the earth’s
environmental “carrying capacity.”32 Moreover, viewing environmental
problems through the lens of economic utility and efficiency can limit our
capacity to radically reimagine ecological systems and our relationships—
including our obligations —to those systems.33 And that is to say nothing
of the dismal failure to date of market-based instruments such as carbon
pricing and trading to mitigate climate change.34
Type 3 problem-solution complexes prioritize pluralism, multistakeholder collaboration, and compromise among competing interests.
The paradigmatic example is the Canadian federal government’s mismanagement of the Newfoundland cod stocks, whereby regulators
attempted to strike a compromise between science-based targets and
industry demands; regulators favoured the latter over the former, resulting
in depletion and collapse.35
The UN Paris Agreement and Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)
are contemporary examples of the Type 3 problem-solution complex,
whereby the policymaking and governance approach itself is substituted
for the end goal.36 David Victor, for example, hailed the Paris Agreement
upon its adoption in 2015 as having transformed climate diplomacy “from
the gridlock and impotence of the past” through its flexibility, which “made
it easier for national governments to tailor their commitments to what they
government’s inability to pick winners in the marketplace is precisely why the preferred climate policy
for almost all economists is to steadily increase the carbon tax on the GHG emissions that we know to
be harmful and let the market forces do the rest.”
32. Cashore & Bernstein, “Bringing the Environment Back In,” supra note 27 at 4.
33. Ibid.
34. See e.g. Daniel Rosenbloom et al, “Why carbon pricing is not sufficient to mitigate climate
change—and how ‘sustainability transition policy’” can help” (2020) 117:16 Proceedings of the
National Academy of Sciences 8664, DOI: <10.1073/pnas.2004093117>. Of course, carbon pricing
and trading are not exclusively economic or regulatory in nature, and their implementation is
inescapably political: see Jason MacLean, “Climate Change, Constitutions, and Courts: The Reference
re Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act and Beyond” (2019) 82:2 Saskatchewan Law Review 147,
online: <canlii.ca/t/smkx> [perma.cc/9HFZ-47ME].
35. See Jeffrey A Hutchings & Ransom A Myers, “What Can Be Learned from the Collapse of a
Renewable Resource? Atlantic Cod, Gadus morhua, of Newfoundland and Labrador” (1994) 51:9 Can
J Fisheries & Aquatic Sciences 2126, DOI: <10.1139/f94-214>.
36. The Paris Agreement’s Nonstate Actor Zone for Climate Action (NAZCA) embodies the Type 3
problem-solution complex: see “Global Climate Action: NAZCA” (last visited 9 August 2022), online:
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change <climateaction.unfccc.int/> [perma.
cc/N4S4-QKY3] [UNFCCC, “NAZCA”]. At this writing, 29,656 nonstate actors are registered on
the NAZCA platform. The SDGs’ tacit endorsement of continued global economic growth and its
explicit call for pluralism and collaboration (SDG 17) also embody the Type 3 approach: see “Goal
17: Strengthen the means of implementation and revitalize the Global Partnership for Sustainable
Development” (last visited 9 August 2022), online: United Nations Department of Economic and
Social Affairs <sdgs.un.org/goals/goal17> [perma.cc/9C5U-7CQY].
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know they can deliver at home.”37 Yet in the very same assessment of the
Paris Agreement’s transformational triumph, Victor argued that even “a
realistic crash program to cut emissions will blow through 2 degrees; 1.5
degrees is ridiculous. New goals are needed.”38 It is difficult to square
these two interpretations of the Paris Agreement as a transformation of
climate diplomacy through compromise whose two express targets are
impossible to achieve and must be replaced.39 What we need are not new
goals, but rather a new policymaking and governance approach capable
of meeting those goals, one that moves beyond the norm of compromise.
As the environmental author and advocate Bill McKibben continually
reminds us, the physics of GHG emissions do not negotiate, and care not
at all for our flexible political compromises.40
Type 2 and Type 3 approaches continue to define the range of legitimate
climate policy options at the level of national institutions and international
organizations.41 Moreover, whether based on market mechanisms or
multistakeholder collaboration, mainstream climate policy remains
focused—uncritically—on continued economic growth and consumption.42
Concepts emerging out of interdisciplinary academic research such as
the Anthropocene, planetary boundaries, and reformulations of limitsto-growth models have yet to penetrate the policy recommendations of
global climate governance organizations, where the dominant discourse
remains the taken-for-granted complementarity of climate protection and
continued global economic development and growth.43 In Type 2 and Type
3 approaches, “the discourse on limits to growth appears as the nagging
doubt underneath the dominant notion of the complementarity of climate
protection and economic growth.”44

37. David G Victor, “Why Paris Worked: A Different Approach to Climate Diplomacy,” Yale
Environment 360 (15 December 2015), online: <e360.yale.edu/features/why_paris_worked_a_
different_approach_to_climate_diplomacy> [perma.cc/JZ7X-WFCW].
38. Ibid.
39. I owe this particular point to Cashore, “Type 4 Environmental Problems,” supra note 27.
40. Bill McKibben, “The Tipping Point,” Yale Environment 360 (2 June 2008), online: <e360.
yale.edu/features/the_tipping_point> [perma.cc/TBF3-JC2P]. See generally Steven Bernstein, The
Compromise of Liberal Environmentalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001).
41. Jonas Meckling & Bentley B Allan, “The Evolution of Ideas in Global Climate Policy” (2020)
10:5 Nature Climate Change 434, DOI: <10.1038/s41558-020-0739-7>. For a critique of this
presumptive complementarity, see Joel Wainwright & Geoff Mann, Climate Leviathan: A Political
Theory of Our Planetary Future (New York: Verso, 2018), especially chapter three and chapter five.
42. Meckling & Allan, supra note 41 at 437.
43. Ibid.
44. Ibid [emphasis added]. But as a colleague of mine suggested in passing, the discourse on limits
to growth may not even be a nagging doubt, for a nagging doubt is a doubt we eventually listen to and
act on.
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Type 4 problem-solution complexes, by contrast, are beginning to
arise out of various interdisciplinary conceptions of the Anthropocene and
planetary boundaries. Type 4 approaches prioritize normative and scientific
imperatives—problems so important that they are incommensurable to
others45—while focusing on the exercise of socio-political power that
must be opposed and overcome through conflict in order to vindicate
those imperatives.46 Coalition building necessarily remains an important
feature of governance and policymaking in Type 4 complexes, but here it
is in service of engaging effectively in strategic conflict, not an end or a
normative priority in and of itself.47
Critically, Type 4 coalition building differs from Type 3 collaboration
precisely because Type 4 coalition building does not brook compromise
among competing interests. As Cashore and Bernstein argue, Type 3
forms of stakeholder engagement and compromise tend to produce only
“incremental” outcomes that rarely depart from the status quo, in large part
owing to the role of powerful business interests, while also reducing the
influence of those whose main objective is to promote pro-environmental
values and outcomes.48
Moreover, Type 4 approaches are critical of the presumptive
complementarity of climate change mitigation and continued economic
growth, and call into question claims of economic efficiency and “cost
effectiveness” as objective, value-neutral metrics by which competing
climate policy options are to be assessed.49 Instead, Type 4 approaches
seek to expose—increasingly through the use of qualitative research
methods attentive to discursive practices and sensitive to diverse normative
contexts—the incentives and disincentives established within institutions
that favour the continued expansion of a carbon-based economy. As
Cashore and Bernstein argue, “utility/economic motivations are the cause
[of environmental problems], not the solution.”50

45. Cashore & Bernstein, “Bringing the Environment Back In,” supra note 27.
46. Kirill Orach, Andreas Duit & Maja Schlüter, “Sustainable Natural Resource Governance Under
Interest Group Competition in Policy-making” (2020) Nature Human Behaviour, DOI: <10.1038/
s41562-020-0885-y> [Orach, Duit & Schlüter, “Interest Group Competition”].
47. Ibid.
48. Cashore & Bernstein, “Bringing the Environment Back In,” supra note 27 at 10, citing Cary
Coglianese, “Assessing Consensus: The Promise and Performance of Negotiated Rulemaking” (1997)
46:6 Duke Law Journal 1255, online: <scholarship.law.duke.edu/dlj/vol46/iss6/1/> [perma.cc/CBK85RNN]. See also Radoslav S Dimitrov, “Empty Institutions in Global Environmental Politics” (2020)
22:3 International Studies Review 626, DOI: <10.1093/isr/viz029>.
49. See e.g. Gregory C Unruh, “Escaping Carbon Lock-in” (2002) 30 Energy Policy 317 at 323,
DOI: <10.1016/S0301-4215(01)00098-2>.
50. Cashore & Bernstein, “Bringing the Environment Back In,” supra note 27 at 7.

480 The Dalhousie Law Journal

Type 4 approaches seek policy designs and governance practices
capable of ameliorating or avoiding altogether the problem in question.51
Cashore and Bernstein identify two distinct methods: societal and
stakeholder conflict, and innovative “policy mixes.”52 About conflict, they
caution scholars who advocate for multistakeholder and intergovernmental
processes not to inadvertently short-circuit “productive societal conflict”
by unwittingly designing Type 3 deliberative processes that “undermine
the contestation required for more significant transformations.”53 They
conclude that the Type 4 prioritization approach requires conceptual and
reflexive analysis, as well as comparative policy studies, to identify and
foster inductively generated policy designs.54 But Cashore and Bernstein
otherwise provide little methodological guidance about how to identify
or facilitate “productive societal conflict,” or where it is to be carried out,
or by whom. Nevertheless, their identification of conflict over societal
priorities and imperatives, coupled with their emphasis on the capacity
for significant transformational change, gestures towards those policies
and venues where the stakes involve the generation and contestation of
fundamental norms about humans’ relationships with nonhuman animals
and ecological systems, including the earth’s climate.
Accordingly, the move from Type 3 to Type 4 is analogous to—
and can be further informed by—the move in legal theory from legal
pluralism to critical legal pluralism and relational approaches to law.55
Critical legal pluralism and relational approaches to law conceive of
the legal subject, be it an individual, the State, or large transnational
corporations, as being constituted by a multiplicity of selves, and not the
archetypal anthropomorphized, autonomous, bounded, and rational agent
of mainstream law, economics, and political science.56 Legal subjects,
like the communities in which they are embedded, are normatively
heterogeneous.57
This does not mean, however, that “inter- and intra-subjective relations
are necessarily democratic or egalitarian.”58 Dominant narratives will be
51. Ibid at 17.
52. Ibid.
53. Ibid.
54. Ibid.
55. See e.g. Martha-Marie Kleinhans & Roderick A Macdonald, “What is a Critical Legal
Pluralism?” (1997) 12:2 Can J L & Soc 25 [Kleinhans & Macdonald, “Critical Legal Pluralism”].
See also Sara L Seck, “Relational Law and the Reimagining of Tools for Environmental and Climate
Justice” (2019) 31:1 CJWL 151 at 160 [Seck, “Relational Law”].
56. Kleinhans & Macdonald, “Critical Legal Pluralism,” supra note 55 at 42.
57. Ibid.
58. Ibid at 43.
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imposed and reproduced. Any project of law reform must accordingly seek
to resist and transform these dominant narratives.59 At the same time, “not
all institutional narratives are equally persuasive to the plethora of selves
of which subjects are composed. In the constant renarration of the subject’s
autobiography, the narrative imagination of other subjects is engaged, the
reciprocal transformation of subjects and institutions is effected.”60
But a crucial caveat is in order. While critical legal pluralism emphasizes
the “law-inventing” and “law-making” character of a broad range of “legal
agents,”61 power relations—and political economy generally—cannot be
imagined away. Political economy plays a fundamental role in structuring
the possibilities of human action.62 This is no mere “academic” distinction.
As Cashore and Bernstein caution, legal and political theories about the
role of global sociopolitical structures and the processes of socioeconomic
class reproduction continue to play a role in shaping—often narrowing—
societal and governmental conceptions of, and responses to, super wicked
problems.63 Indeed, environmental law and policy problems—including
climate change and biodiversity loss—are characterized as “hot” because
the “agreed frames, legal and otherwise, for how we understand and act in
the world are in a constant state of flux and contestation.”64 Environmental
problems are “hot,” moreover, not simply because they are “controversial,”
but because “the controversies are structural and foundational.”65
This iterative discursive process of institutional narration and individual
renarration embedded in an increasingly unequal and unsustainable global
political economy is presently playing out publicly within a number of
the world’s largest corporations, including powerful corporations like
Amazon.com,66 whose much-publicized net-zero climate pledge—and
59. Ibid at 44.
60. Ibid at 43.
61. Ibid; see also Roderick A Macdonald & David Sandomierski, “Against Nomopolies” (2006)
57:4 NILQ 610, online: <ir.lib.uwo.ca/lawpub/297/> [perma.cc/Z77G-X7LN].
62. My thanks to David Sandomierski for drawing out this distinction between critical legal
pluralism and political economy. See David Sandomierski, “Law and Living: Connecting the Dots:
The Life of an Academic Lawyer by Harry W Arthurs” Book Review (2021) 58:2 Osgoode Hall LJ
467 at 472–473, online: <digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/ohlj/vol58/iss2/7/> [perma.cc/AB73ENVK].
63. Cashore & Bernstein, “Bringing the Environment Back In,” supra note 27.
64. Elizabeth Fisher, “Environmental Law as ‘Hot’ Law” (2013) 25:3 Journal of Environmental Law
347 at 347–348, DOI: <10.1093/jel/eqt025>.
65. Ibid at 350.
66. In addition to the examples of BlackRock and Microsoft noted above in footnote 8, two
prominent examples at the time of writing include The New York Times, and Facebook Inc. At The New
York Times, a number of employees formed a group called “Black@NYT” to protest the newspaper’s
decision to publish an opinion-editorial by a US Senator entitled “Send in the Troops” in response to
protests against police violence in the United States in the aftermath of the killing of George Floyd.
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the Amazon Employees for Climate Justice’s remarkable opposition to
the company’s pledge—provides an opportune, on-the-ground climate
governance case to apply Cashore and Bernstein’s heuristic typology of
environmental policymaking and governance approaches and assess its
implications for transformative climate action.
Thus, the ultimate aim of this article is to explore how Cashore and
Bernstein’s approach can be applied and further developed in respect of
the increasing role that transnational corporations claim to be playing in
global climate governance, including the role of strategic conflict with—
and within—transnational corporations on the grounds of their stated
climate commitments. Specifically, I will argue that strategic policy and
governance conflict is a necessary—but not sufficient—step toward the
transformation of transnational corporations into stewards of planetary
sustainability. The next step in this analysis is to briefly explain the
nonstate-actor turn in climate governance, for it is within this particular
context that corporations have emerged as key climate actors.
II. The nonstate-actor turn in climate governance
1. From state inaction to nonstate climate leadership
Since multilateral diplomatic climate change discussions and negotiations
began in 1990, annual global CO2 emissions have increased by over 60
per cent.67 National governments’ and international, multilateral climate
summits’ approach of agreeing to reduce GHG emissions below arbitrarily
defined baseline levels by arbitrarily defined deadlines has not succeeded.
Global GHG emissions reached a new record in 2018, and increased again
in 2019.68 But for the COVID-19 pandemic, global GHG emissions would
most likely have increased yet again in 2020.69 At this writing, global
GHG emissions from energy rebounded and reached their highest-ever

A letter signed by over 1,000 employees of the newspaper resulted in its publisher’s decision to
replace the newspaper’s opinions editor and remake its opinions section. See Ben Smith, “Inside
the Revolts Erupting in America’s Big Newsrooms,” The New York Times (7 June 2020), online:
<www.nytimes.com> [perma.cc/2H5L-VSQX]. Relatedly, employees at Facebook Inc. internally and
publicly demanded—in the form of a virtual “walkout”—that the platform remove a post made by
US president Donald Trump in respect of the same public protests over police violence. While the
company’s CEO Mark Zuckerberg refused to do so, he addressed a virtual meeting of several thousand
employees in an attempt to explain and justify his reasoning. See Mike Isaac, Cecilia Kang & Sheera
Frenkel, “Zuckerberg Defends Hands-Off Approach to Trump’s Posts,” The New York Times (3 June
2020), online: <www.nytimes.com> [perma.cc/UJ2X-NKPS].
67. Global Carbon Project, “Global Carbon Budget: Carbon Budget 2019” (4 December 2019),
online: www.globalcarbonproject.org/carbonbudget/index.htm [perma.cc/KSH7-RAYP].
68. Pierre Friedlingstein et al, “Global Carbon Budget 2019” (2019) 11 Earth System Science Data
1783.
69. Ibid.
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level in history in 2021.70 A new approach to global climate policymaking
and governance is urgently needed.
The limitations of the state-driven, multilateral approach to global
climate governance have long been apparent to climate governance
scholars.71 Following the failure of the 2009 United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) negotiations in Copenhagen,
which quickly devolved from “Hopenhagen” to “Brokenhagen,”72 a
growing number of climate governance scholars began to prioritize the
potential of nonstate actors to catalyze climate change mitigation.73 One
commentator went so far as to declare that “minilateralism” had become
the new “conventional wisdom” of climate governance in developed
countries.74 Nonstate actors, once viewed as peripheral to global climate
governance, were all of a sudden considered—and called upon—to
perform a central and crucial role.75
The nonstate-actor turn in global climate governance is reflected in
the design of the 2015 Paris Agreement.76 The Agreement’s structure
reflects the proliferating climate initiatives of international organizations,
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs and ENGOS), corporations,
trade unions, subnational authorities (especially cities), certification
and standards-setting bodies, academic researchers, and transnational
70. International Energy Agency, “Global CO2 Emissions Rebounded to Their Highest Level in
History in 2021” (8 March 2022), online: <www.iea.org/news/global-co2-emissions-rebounded-totheir-highest-level-in-history-in-2021> [perma.cc/KE69-SR7B].
71. See e.g. Brian Walker et al, “Looming Global-Scale Failures and Missing Institutions” (2009)
325:5946 Science 1345. The skepticism continues to grow: Jeff Tollefson, “Top Climate Scientists
are Sceptical that Nations can Rein in Global Warming” (2021) 599:7883 Nature 22, online: <www.
nature.com/articles/d41586-021-02990-w> [perma.cc/2BFW-TVK5].
72. See e.g. Meinhard Doelle, “The Legacy of the Climate Talks in Copenhagen: Hopenhagen or
Brokenhagen?” (2010) 4:1 Carbon & Climate L Rev 86; Daniel Bodansky, “The Copenhagen Climate
Change Conference: A Postmortem” (2010) 104:2 Am J Intl L 230.
73. See e.g. Sander Chan et al, “Reinvigorating International Climate Policy: A Comprehensive
Framework for Effective Nonstate Action” (2015) 6:4 Global Policy 466, DOI: <10.1111/17585899.12294>. See also David G Victor, Global Warming Gridlock: Creating More Effective Strategies
for Protecting the Planet (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2011); Matthew J Hoffman,
Climate Governance at the Crossroads: Experimenting with a Global Response after Kyoto (New
York: Oxford University Press, 2011). For a helpful summary of this change in focus, see Harriet
Bulkeley, Mark Cooper & Johannes Stripple, “Encountering Climate’s New Governance” in Peter
Dauvergne & Justin Alger, eds, A Research Agenda for Global Environmental Politics (Cheltenham,
UK: Edward Elgar, 2018) 137, DOI: <10.4337/9781788110952>.
74. David Roberts, “A Way to Win the Climate Fight,” The American Prospect (10 May 2011),
online: <www.prospect.org> [perma.cc/B87U-YRJD].
75. See Robert O Keohane & David G Victor, “The Regime Complex for Climate Change” (2011)
9:1 Perspectives on Politics 7.
76. Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Twenty-First Session, Held in Paris from 30
November to 13 December 2015 Addendum Part Two: Action taken by the Conference of the Parties at
its Twenty-First Session, UNFCCOR, 21st Sess, Annex, Paris Agreement, UN Doc FCCC/CP/2015/10/
Add.1 (2016) at 21-36 (entered into force 4 November 2016) [Paris Agreement].
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knowledge, policy, and governance networks comprising various
constellations of these nonstate actors. Nonstate actors perform a number
of formal and informal roles in the Agreement. Importantly, they help
monitor states’ progress toward meeting their commitments. By doing so
they increase the transparency around states’ levels of compliance with the
Agreement and, in theory if not yet in practice, encourage states to ratchet
up their levels of compliance and ambition.
Nonstate actors also make climate action commitments of their
own under the Paris Agreement. By registering their own commitments,
initiatives, actions, and progress on the Paris Agreement’s NAZCA
platform,77 nonstate actors are able to play a number of climate governance
roles, ranging from undertaking independent commitments to reduce
their own GHG emissions, to participating in multi-level governance
partnerships, to experimenting with ways to scale-up local initiatives to
broader levels of governance.78
Similarly, the UN 2015 report Transforming Our World: The 2030
Agenda for Sustainable Development—which established the Sustainable
Development Goals (SDGs)—encourages collaborative partnerships
among governments, civil society, and the private sector.79
The perceived importance of nonstate climate actors has increased
significantly in the years following the adoption of the Paris Agreement
in 2015 in light of the Agreement’s own insufficient level of ambition80
as well as states’ insufficient progress toward meeting the Agreement’s
targets.81
The nonstate-actor turn in global climate governance, however, has
less to do with nonstate actors’ actual capacity and ability to coordinate
and scale-up mitigation initiatives than the endemic failure of states to
make good on their own climate pledges. Advocates of nonstate climate
action, particularly private climate governance initiatives, tend to point
to the pledges of large and powerful transnational corporations, such
77. UNFCCC, “NAZCA,” supra note 36.
78. The importance of nonstate actions is reflected in the text of the Paris Agreement, supra note
76 at paras 117-118 (mandating the continuation of the NAZCA) and 133-136 (welcoming and
encouraging all non-party stakeholders).
79. United Nations, Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (New
York: United Nations, 2015).
80. Joeri Rogelj et al, “Paris Agreement Climate Proposals Need a Boost to Keep Warming Well
Below 2 ºC” (2016) 534 Nature 631, DOI: <10.1038/nature18307> [Rogelj et al, “Paris Agreement”].
81. See e.g. Angel Hsu et al, “Towards a New Climate Diplomacy” (2015) 5 Nat Clim Change 501,
DOI: <10.1038/nclimate2594>; Andrew J Jordan, “Emergence of Polycentric Climate Governance
and its Future Prospects” (2015) 5 Nat Clim Change 977, DOI: <10.1038/nclimate2725>; Charles
F Sabel & David G Victor, “Governing Global Problems Under Uncertainty: Making Bottom-Up
Climate Policy Work” (2017) 144 Clim Change 15, DOI: <10.1007/s10584-015-1507-y>.
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as Walmart’s pledge to reduce its GHG emissions by one billion metric
tonnes by influencing behaviour change within its global supply chains.82
Of course, Walmart is only in a position to make a pledge of such
magnitude because its GHG emissions are so unsustainably large in the
first place.83 Skepticism is thus warranted. The past two decades of efforts
to leverage the supply-chain power of major transnational corporations
have failed to meet the expectations of enhanced sustainability.84 Serious
questions remain about the capacity and coordination levels of nonstate
climate actors—including major transnational corporations—to (1) fill
the mitigation gap created by state inaction, and (2) catalyze greater
levels of state action and ambition.85 A more recent analysis of 25 of
the world’s largest companies—which together were responsible for
approximately five per cent of global GHG emissions as of 2022—only
affirms this skepticism. Just three of those companies have meaningfully
committed to deep decarbonization. The 13 of 25 companies that provided
transparent details about their net-zero emissions pledges would actually
reduce emissions by just 40 per cent, not 100 per cent. The remaining 12
companies had yet as of this writing to provide transparent details about
their commitments, making them impossible to assess, much less credit.86
Collectively, these 25 companies have specifically committed to reducing
less than 20 per cent of their total GHG emissions.87
Nevertheless, in the post-Paris era of global climate governance,
it has become commonplace to call for nonstate actors, particularly
powerful transnational corporations, to play a leading role in reducing

82. Walmart, “Walmart on Track to Reduce 1 Billion Metric Tons of Emissions from Global Supply
Chains by 2030” (8 May 2019), online: <corporate.walmart.com> [perma.cc/2GPK-X5G6]. See
generally Michael P Vandenbergh & Jonathan M Gilligan, Beyond Politics: The Private Governance
Response to Climate Change (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2017).
83. See Peter Dauvergne & Jane Lister, “Big Brand Sustainability: Governance Prospects and
Environmental Limits” (2012) 22:1 Global Environmental Change 36 [Dauvergne & Lister, “Big
Brand Sustainability”]. In 2019, Walmart’s GHG emissions were 203.1 MtCO2e. See Day et al, supra
note 5 at 107.
84. See e.g. Jane Lister, “The Policy Role of Corporate Carbon Management: Co-regulating
Ecological Effectiveness” (2018) 9:4 Global Policy 538, DOI: <10.1111/1758-5899.12618>; Peter
Dauvergne, Will Big Business Destroy Our Planet? (Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2018).
85. See e.g. Jason MacLean, “Rethinking the Role of Nonstate Actors in International Climate
Governance” (2020) 16:1 Loy U Chi Intl L Rev 21, online: <lawecommons.luc.edu/lucilr/vol16/
iss1/3/> [perma.cc/UXY4-J5GH] [MacLean, “Rethinking the Role of Nonstate Actors”].
86. Day et al, supra note 5.
87. Ibid at 5.
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GHG emissions88 and to promote greater socio-ecological stewardship.89
Below I discuss an important proposal for this brand of corporate climate
stewardship that usefully brings into relief this nonstate-actor-leadership
rationale, which otherwise tends to be left implicit in a number of other
such proposals and platforms.90
2. Corporate biosphere stewardship
A group of highly prominent interdisciplinary sustainability scholars led
by Carl Folke has called for greater corporate biosphere stewardship as a
88. See e.g. David G Victor, “Taking the Lead: Faced with Government Inaction, Private Firms
Emerge as Major Players in Climate Change Mitigation” (2017) 358:6370 Science 1547, DOI:
<10.1126/science.aar2637>; William Burnside, “Corporations and Climate” (2019) 2:4 Nature
Sustainability 256, DOI: <10.1038/s41893-019-0283-5>; Saphira AC Rekker, Jacquelyn E Humphrey
& Katherine R O’Brien, “Do Sustainability Rating Schemes Capture Climate Goals?” (2019) 60:1
Business & Society 125, DOI: < 10.1177/0007650319825764>.
89. See e.g. Carl Folke et al, “An Invitation for More Research on Transnational Corporations and
the Biosphere” (2020) 4:4 Nature Ecology & Evolution 494, DOI: <10.1038/s41559-020-1145-2>;
Anselm Schneider et al, “Can Transnational Corporations Leverage Systemic Change Towards a
‘Sustainable’ Future?” (2020) 4:4 Nature Ecology & Evolution 491, DOI: <10.1038/s41559-0201143-4> [Schneider et al, “Can Transnational Corporations Leverage Systemic Change”]; Dror
Etzion, “Corporate Engagement with the Natural Environment” (2020) 4:4 Nature Ecology &
Evolution 493, DOI: < 10.1038/s41559-020-1142-5] [Etzion, “Corporate Engagement”]; Folke et al,
“Transnational Corporations,” supra note 1; Henrik Österblom et al, “Emergence of a Global Sciencebusiness Initiative for Ocean Stewardship” (2017) 114:34 Proc Natl Acad Sci 9038, DOI: <10.1073/
pnas.1704453114>; Henrik Österblom et al, “Transnational Corporations as ‘Keystone Actors’ in
Marine Ecosystems” (2015) 10:5 PLOS ONE e0127533, DOI: <10.1371/journal.pone.0127533>.
90. See e.g. Gold Standard, WWF & CDP, “Corporate Climate Stewardship: Guidelines for best
practice climate action in the Paris Agreement era” (May 2018), online (pdf): <www.goldstandard.org/
sites/default/files/documents/gs_corporate_climate_stewardship.pdf> [perma.cc/XK8T-V8NB]; “UN
Global Compact Releases Environmental Strategy” (25 June 2010), online: International Institute
for Sustainable Development <sdg.iisd.org/news/un-global-compact-releases-environmentalstewardship-strategy/> [perma.cc/5M7W-NEKD]; “How to Set Up Effective Climate Governance on
Corporate Boards: Guiding principles and questions” (January 2019), online (pdf): <www3.weforum.
org/docs/WEF_Creating_effective_climate_governance_on_corporate_boards.pdf> [perma.cc/5ZN3MZLK]; “Race to Zero Campaign” (last visited 26 August 2022), online: UNFCCC <unfccc.int/
climate-action/race-to-zero-campaign#eq-2> [perma.cc/54PV-CPJC]; “The Glasgow Climate Pact—
Key Outcomes from COP26” (last visited 26 August 2022), online: UNFCCC <unfccc.int/processand-meetings/the-paris-agreement/the-glasgow-climate-pact-key-outcomes-from-cop26>
[perma.
cc/KT2K-R4HQ] (including new commitments made by the Glasgow Financial Alliance for Net
Zero (GFANZ)—arising out of the UNFCCC Cop 26 in 2021); “Glasglow Financial Alliance for
Net Zero” (last visited 26 August 2022), online: <www.gfanzero.com/> [perma.cc/2UDM-ZA4B];
“Ambitious Corporate Climate Action” (last visited 26 August 2022), online: <sciencebasedtargets.
org> [perma.cc/7E9U-LELQ]; “Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures” (last visited 26
August 2022), online: TCFD <www.fsb-tcfd.org/> [perma.cc/GTP6-5TAG]. Another article, indeed
an entire book, might fruitfully analyze these initiatives as examples of the increasing investment—
faith, even—being placed in the science-business-society interface to address climate change and
biodiversity loss. As an example of this faith, see Andrew Hoffman, Management as a Calling:
Leading Business, Serving Society (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2021). For the purposes
of this article, however, I argue that we can better understand the potential and the limits of this
interface by critically examining a recent, highly explicit, and sophisticated illustration and explication
of it, the corporate biosphere stewardship proposal, to which I turn below.
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“new business logic with the purpose of shepherding and safeguarding the
resilience of the biosphere for human well-being.”91 In recognition of the
well-established harmful link between dominant transnational corporations
and the biosphere, Folke and his colleagues argue that such dominance
can be redirected to “leverage large-scale systemic change, accelerate
positive transformations towards sustainability and contribute to a safe
operating environmental space for humanity.”92 Transformative change
toward biosphere stewardship, they further argue, “can be facilitated by
clarifications of a corporate global license to operate in a democratic,
ethical, and sustainable manner.”93
Folke and his colleagues argue that the following six observed and
emerging features of the science-business-society interface illustrate the
transformative potential of corporate biosphere stewardship:
(1) Alignment of vision: “There is mounting evidence that new
norms are emerging among some of the largest brands” (e.g. The UN
Global Compact is serving as a learning arena “for directing business
practices towards sustainability and generating ecologically coherent
innovations for biosphere stewardship”);94
(2) Mainstreaming sustainability: “Sustainability is no longer
perceived as a choice for progressive companies—it has become
institutionalized and increasingly recognized as a necessity”;95
(3) License to operate: “Transformative change towards biosphere
stewardship can be facilitated by clarifications of a corporate global
license to operate in a democratic, ethical and sustainable manner”;96
(4) Financial transformations: “Sustainability concerns are gaining
attention from the financial sector”;97
(5) Radical transparency: “By embracing and promoting such
transparency, TNCs can minimize risk in their supply chains and

91. Folke et al, “Transnational Corporations,” supra note 1 at 1401.
92. Ibid at 1398.
93. Ibid at 1400. The authors cite as examples of corporate regulation in this social license direction
the United Kingdom’s Modern Slavery Act, which requires companies to disclose measures adopted
to address slavery and human trafficking, and France’s Corporate Duty of Vigilance, which in 2017
created a legal requirement for large companies to identify and prevent abuses of human rights and the
environment related to their activities and those of their subsidiaries.
94. Ibid at 1398.
95. Ibid at 1400.
96. Ibid at 1400.
97. Ibid at 1400.
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contribute to system-wide stewardship norms, while ensuring
corporate accountability”;98 and
(6) Evidence-based knowledge for action: “Scientists, as knowledge
brokers, increasingly facilitate and monitor transformative change by
connecting evidence-based knowledge to action through dialogue and
collaboration.”99
The corporate biosphere stewardship proposal advanced by Folke
and his colleagues is a laudable effort to respond to the climate crisis and
transnational corporations’ arguably dominant role in precipitating that
crisis in a constructive, solutions-based, and optimistic manner; I will
return to this point below. But the impact of their proposal is limited both
by evidentiary gaps and conceptual oversights. I will discuss each in turn,
drawing both on global surveys of transnational corporate conduct as well
as specific evidence concerning four large and powerful transnational
corporations from three different sectors: (1) BlackRock (financial
asset management), (2) Google (information technology), (3) Microsoft
(information technology and consumer goods); and (4) ExxonMobil (oil
and gas production).
3. Limitations of corporate biosphere stewardship
a. Evidentiary gaps
There is very little evidence to support the sweeping nature of the six
emergent features of the science-business-society interface described by
Folke and his colleagues. In fact, there is strong evidence to the contrary,
including the evidence briefly discussed in the previous section of this
article showing that many of the world’s largest corporations have not yet
clearly committed themselves to decarbonization or sustainability more
broadly.100 For example, with respect to the “alignment of vision” and
the learning potential of the UN Global Compact, the evidence suggests
that transnational corporations are not meeting the high expectations of
compliance with international norms of ecological stewardship and the
respect for human rights that are intrinsic to—and inseparable from—
sustainability, resilience, and human well-being. According to the 2018
report of the Corporate Human Rights Benchmark, an NGO whose mandate
is to determine how the world’s largest corporations perform on human
rights, the “[t]he overall picture is deeply concerning; most companies
98. Ibid at 1401.
99. Ibid at 1401.
100. Day et al, supra note 5.
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score poorly on the Benchmark, indicating weak implementation of the
UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights.”101 The Corporate
Human Rights Benchmark concluded in 2018 that its findings “should
provide food for thought for governments considering the role of legislation
in business and human rights and should also serve as a wake-up call for
businesses and investors everywhere.”102
Since 2016, the Corporate Human Rights Benchmark has assessed 100
of the largest publicly listed companies from high-risk sectors, including
agricultural products, apparel, and extractives. In 2019, the Benchmark
added a fourth sector, information and communications technology
manufacturing, and assessed 200 of the world’s largest companies. The
Benchmark concluded that those companies
are painting a distressing picture; most companies are scoring poorly and
the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights are clearly
not being implemented. That one quarter of the companies score less
than 10% and a full half of the companies fail to meet any of the five
basic criteria for human rights due diligence should alarm governments
and investors.103

Neither is it yet the case that the world is witnessing a transformation
in the financial sector. In the spring of 2020, the world’s largest financial
asset manager, BlackRock, refused to vote in favour of shareholder
resolutions at two large Australian oil companies—Woodside Energy, and
Santos—that would have required each company to set GHG-emissionsreduction targets in line with the ambition of the Paris Agreement as well
as to publicly disclose their lobbying activities.104 Only months earlier,
however, BlackRock had announced in a widely celebrated letter to
companies and its own shareholders that it planned to put sustainability at
the core of its investment processes. BlackRock’s CEO, Larry Fink, wrote
that awareness of climate change is rapidly changing, and the world is “on

101. Corporate Human Rights Benchmark, “Corporate Human Rights Benchmark 2018 Key
Findings: Apparel, Agricultural Products and Extractive Companies” (2019) at 4, online (pdf): World
Benchmarking Alliance <www.worldbenchmarkingalliance.org> [perma.cc/YP6K-QP5A].
102. Ibid.
103. Corporate Human Rights Benchmark, “2019 Key Findings. Across Sectors: Agricultural
Products, Apparel, Extractives & ICT Manufacturing” (2020), at 4, online (pdf): World Benchmarking
Alliance <www.worldbenchmarkingalliance.org> [perma.cc/EFR7-2Y7Q]. For a helpful discussion
of the UN Guiding Principles, see Sara L Seck, “Transnational Judicial and Non-Judicial Remedies
for Corporate Human Rights Harms: Challenges of and for Law” (2013) 31:1 Windsor YB Access Just
177 at 194, DOI: <10.22329/wyaj.v31i1.4320>.
104. Attracta Mooney, “BlackRock Accused on Climate Change Hypocrisy,” Financial Times (17
May 2020), online: <www.ft.com/content/0e489444-2783-4f6e-a006-aa8126d2ff46> [perma.cc/
FW3N-RMRW].
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the edge of a fundamental reshaping of finance.”105 Unsurprisingly, climate
advocates charged BlackRock with climate change hypocrisy when it so
swiftly failed to put its money where its mouth was.
Yet it is worth pausing to consider just what BlackRock actually
pledged to do in terms of climate action in its loudly trumpeted but perhaps
less scrutinized letter in early 2020. Far from divesting from fossil-fuel
investments, BlackRock pledged to exclude companies generating more
than 25 per cent of revenues from thermal coal production. However, an
investment of up to 25 per cent in a coal producer is still a significant
financial position, one that allows BlackRock to maintain its investments
in large coal producers, including Glencore, which is the world’s largest
exporter of seaborne thermal coal despite the fact that only six per cent of
its revenues flow from its coal-export business.106
Moreover, BlackRock’s noteworthy pledge applies only to its US$1.8
trillion of active funds. As a result, its coal divestment will affect US$500
million, or 0.007 per cent, of its total holdings of US$7 trillion.107 The
international climate movement Extinction Rebellion remarked in response
to BlackRock’s pledge that “the world’s biggest miners and polluters will
not be losing any sleep over this.”108
More generally, the on-the-ground impact of sustainability investing
has yet to match its promises, both at BlackRock and elsewhere. A
former Chief Investment Officer for Sustainable Investing at BlackRock
explains that many investment strategies are highly liquid and have very
short holding periods, making them a poor fit with the long-run goals of
environmental and social governance (ESG) investing.109 Compounding
105. Quoted in Attracta Mooney & Owen Walker, “BlackRock Seeks to Regain Lost Ground
in Climate Fight,” Financial Times (14 January 2020), online: <www.ft.com/content/36282d8636e4-11ea-a6d3-9a26f8c3cba4> [perma.cc/XX3B-3RDA]. In 2019, BlackRock supported just 12
per cent of environmental shareholder resolutions, which typically call on corporations to disclose
their climate-related risks and outline their plans for transitioning to a low-carbon world. Anecdotal
evidence suggests, however, that many BlackRock employees have advocated internally for stronger
climate action, and that millennial investors share that preference (ibid). BlackRock may yet evolve
into an important climate leader.
106. Ibid.
107. Ibid.
108. Quoted in ibid. BlackRock is hardly alone in its climate hypocrisy. Companies and institutional
investors are increasingly touting their climate change credentials. Evidence compiled by the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) suggests, however, that the risk of climate-change-induced
disasters such as storms, floods, and wildfires are not reflected in the price of equities on global
markets. Moreover, when such disasters do occur, they appear to precipitate only modest reductions
in share prices. See International Monetary Fund, “Chapter 5: Climate Change: Physical Risk and
Equity Prices” in Global Financial Stability Report: Markets in the Time of COVID-19 (April 2020),
online: <www.imf.org/~/media/Files/Publications/GFSR/2020/April/English/ch5.ashx> [perma.cc/
QC7T-AF9A].
109. Tariq Fancy, “BlackRock Hired Me to Make Sustainable Investing Mainstream. Now I Realize
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this problem, investment managers are—or largely perceive themselves
to be—legally obligated to focus on maximizing risk-adjusted, short-term
financial profits, not long-term ESG goals, and this misalignment will not
correct itself; effective government regulation will be required.110
What is true for BlackRock is true for the financial sector in general.
Not only are the necessary incentives absent, but they may also be
fundamentally misaligned. As investors divest heavily polluting firms
and assets, those firms and assets are being purchased by private-equity
firms and hedge funds, which operate independent of public oversight.111
Compounding this problem is the issue of coverage—by one estimation,
publicly listed firms that are not state-controlled account for only 14–32
per cent of global GHG emissions.112 State-controlled companies such as
Coal India and Saudi Aramco are major GHG emitters that largely operate
outside the influence of institutional fund managers and private-sector
bankers.113 Finally, accurate measurement and transparency (discussed
further below) pose additional obstacles to the adoption of sustainable
finance. There is presently no way to accurately measure the carbon
footprint of a financial portfolio without double counting emissions, which
arise throughout multiple supply chains and financial flows.114
Nor, finally, are many major transnational corporations yet practicing
radical transparency, particularly in respect of their climate commitments;
BlackRock’s climate pledge, by contrast, is plain enough, but only to those
who take the trouble to look closely. For example, in response to a report
by the ENGO Greenpeace USA about the use of cloud computing tools
to expedite oil and gas extraction, Google announced it would no longer
build custom artificial intelligence tools to locate and access oil and gas
deposits.115
it’s a Deadly Distraction from the Climate-change Threat,” The Globe and Mail (30 March 2021),
online: <www.theglobeandmail.com/business/commentary/article-sustainable-investing-is-a-deadlydistraction-from-actually-averting/> [perma.cc/PK28-8XR9].
110. Ibid.
111. “The Uses and Abuses of Green Finance,” The Economist, (4 November 2021), online: <www.
economist.com/leaders/the-uses-and-abuses-of-green-finance/21806111> [perma.cc/P29X-PY5S].
112. Ibid.
113. Ibid.
114. Ibid. See also Lucrezia Reichlin, “Accounting for Climate Change” (11 November 2021), online
(blog): Project Syndicate <www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/cop26-creation-of-internationalsustainability-standards-board-climate-reporting-by-lucrezia-reichlin-2021-11>
[perma.cc/9MASX2TT].
115. Matt O’Brien, “Google Says it Won’t Develop AI for Oil and Gas Extraction,” The Globe and
Mail (19 May 2020), online: <www.theglobeandmail.com/business/technology/article-google-saysit-wont-develop-ai-for-oil-and-gas-extraction/> [perma.cc/2BPQ-797T]. See also Tim Donaghy,
Caroline Henderson & Elizabeth Jardim, “Oil in the Cloud: How Tech Companies are Helping
Big Oil Profit from Climate Destruction” (19 May 2020), online: Greenpeace <www.greenpeace.
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Google’s pledge to wean itself off of oil and gas consulting immediately
turned the spotlight on Microsoft’s and Amazon’s contracts with fossil fuel
firms. According to Greenpeace’s report, Microsoft appears to be a leader
in this field, “offering AI capabilities in all phases of oil production.”116
In early 2020, Microsoft’s president, Brad Smith, announced
that Microsoft would be “carbon negative” by 2030.117 As part of this
pledge, Microsoft plans to reduce its emissions “by more than half by
2030, both for our direct emissions and for our entire supply and value
chain.”118 Microsoft further pledged to remove from the environment all
of the carbon dioxide that the company has emitted “either directly or by
electrical consumption” since its founding in 1975.119
Microsoft’s climate plan is ambitious on its face, and expressly
grounded in “science and math.”120 Climate scientists measure and report
GHG emissions by classifying them into three scopes (see Fig. 2, below).

org/usa/reports/oil-in-the-cloud/> [perma.cc/VB25-4QWE] [Greenpeace, “Oil in the Cloud”]. More
generally, full transparency in respect of corporate climate actions and risks remains rare. In addition
to the instances discussed above, see e.g. “Why are Investors not Pricing in Climate-change Risk?,”
The Economist (2 June 2020), online: <www.economist.com/graphic-detail/2020/06/02/why-areinvestors-not-pricing-in-climate-change-risk> [perma.cc/2GMK-LY7D].
116. Greenpeace, “Oil in the Cloud,” supra note 115 at Executive Summary. I will discuss Amazon’s
involvement in oil and gas extraction in Part IV of the article, below.
117. Brad Smith, “Microsoft will be Carbon Negative by 2030” (16 January 2020), Official Microsoft
Blog online (blog): <blogs.microsoft.com/blog/2020/01/16/microsoft-will-be-carbon-negativeby-2030/> [perma.cc/8JJY-JLRD] [Smith, “Microsoft will be Carbon Negative”]. “Carbon negative”
means an emitter removes more carbon from the atmosphere than it emits. “Net zero” means than
an emitter removes just as much carbon as it emits. “Carbon neutral,” by contrast, can be achieved
through a combination of direct reduction and/or removal in conjunction with offsetting remaining
emissions with payments to others (e.g. to plant trees, or not to cut down trees). Due to monitoring
and verification limitations, carbon offsetting does not necessarily result in reduced emissions, and
may even increase emissions in many instances. For a helpful discussion, see Kate Ervine, Carbon
(Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2018) at 69-70, 92, 115.
118. Smith, “Microsoft will be Carbon Negative,” supra note 117.
119. Ibid.
120. The Greenhouse Gas Protocol—A Corporate Accounting and Reporting Standard, Revised
edition (Washington, DC: World Business Council on Sustainable Development & World Resources
Institute, 2015).
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Fig. 2. Direct and indirect GHG emissions121

Scope 1 emissions are the direct emissions resulting from an
organization’s activities. Scope 2 emissions are the indirect emissions
from the production of the electricity an organization purchases and
uses. Scope 3 emissions are all of the other indirect emissions resulting
from an organization’s activities, including the emissions embedded in
an organization’s supply chain, the complete life cycle of its products
and services, the business travel of an organization’s members, and the
emissions stemming from the waste produced by an organization.122
Among corporate and institutional climate plans, Microsoft’s “carbon
negative” pledge—what it calls a “moonshot”—is exceptional insofar
as it includes the company’s Scope 3 emissions.123 For example, in 2013
the University of California (UC) system—comprising 10 campuses
and more than 250,000 students—pledged to become carbon neutral by
2025. Discussing UC’s approach to “deep decarbonization” in 2018, the
noted climate policy scholar David Victor and his colleagues explained
that the UC pledge covered the direct Scope 1 emissions of UC-owned
infrastructure and the indirect Scope 2 emissions resulting from UC’s
purchase of electric power. The UC pledge, however, does not include
other indirect Scope 3 emissions. According to Victor and his colleagues,
121. Adapted from ibid.
122. Ibid.
123. Smith, “Microsoft will be Carbon Negative,” supra note 117.

494 The Dalhousie Law Journal

“[i]ndirect emissions from employee-owned vehicles, off-campus
commuting, air travel, and those embodied in consumed goods and
services are subject to long-term goals but actionable plans will require
more leadership.”124 The UC system’s 2025 climate pledge, while still
important, is misleading, and not as ambitious as it initially appears.
The same can be said of Microsoft’s ostensibly ambitious climate plan.
Despite both the ambition and the commitment to effective transparency—
“real progress requires real transparency”125—expressed in Microsoft’s
climate plan, Microsoft did not explicitly disclose its decision to exclude
from its measurement of its Scope 3 emissions the direct, upstream, and
downstream GHG emissions resulting from its ongoing work with oil and
gas producers. Instead, under the heading “Empowering customers around
the world,” Microsoft explained
The significance and complexity of the task ahead is incredible and
will require contributions from every person and organization on the
planet. That’s why we are committed to continuing to work with all of
our customers, including those in the oil and gas business, to help them
meet today’s business demands while innovating together to achieve the
business needs of a net zero carbon future. Continued improvement in
standards of living around the world will require more energy, not less.
It’s imperative that we enable energy companies to transition, including
to renewable energy and to the development and use of negative emission
technologies like carbon capture and storage and direct air capture. All
this must be paired together to achieve the growing energy needs of an
expanding global economy.126

Microsoft’s rationale, couched in terms of facilitating the global
transition to sustainability, recalls the tone and substance of Folke
and his colleagues’ call for corporate biosphere stewardship. Yet
Microsoft’s reasoning is neither radically transparent nor ecologically
coherent. As exposed not only by Greenpeace but also Microsoft’s own
employees, including the “Microsoft Workers 4 Good Coalition” and the
pseudonymous whistleblower “Zero Cool,” Microsoft’s contracts with oil
and gas producers threaten to undermine Microsoft’s climate action plan.

124. David G Victor el al, “Turning Paris into a reality at the University of California” (2018) 8 Nat
Clim Change 183 at 183.
125. Smith, “Microsoft will be Carbon Negative,” supra note 117.
126. Ibid [emphasis added]. Microsoft’s staff are comparatively more candid and transparent
regarding the limitations of the company’s carbon-removal efforts, including inconsistent definitions
of net-zero emissions, poor measurement and accounting of carbon, and an immature market for
carbon removal and carbon offsets. See Lucas Joppa et al, “Microsoft’s Million-tonne CO2-removal
Purchase—Lessons for Net Zero” (2021) 597 Nature 629, online: <www.nature.com/articles/d41586021-02606-3> [perma.cc/P3YM-4W8N].
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Through its Azure cloud computing division, Microsoft helps facilitate
each phase of oil and gas production, including in the Texas Permian
Basin and Alberta’s oil sands. Microsoft elsewhere explains that its cloud
computing technology will facilitate ExxonMobil—one of the world’s
largest publicly listed oil and gas producers—to increase its production
in the Permian Basin by as much as 50,000 oil-equivalent barrels per
day in the year 2025.127 According to Greenpeace USA, this represents
approximately five per cent of ExxonMobil’s projected Permian Basin oil
production for 2025, and could add as much as 3.4 million metric tonnes
of CO2e into the atmosphere by 2025.128 That total represents 21 per cent
of Microsoft’s 2020 projected annual carbon footprint—Scopes 1, 2, and
3 combined—of 16 million metric tonnes of CO2e. That total, moreover,
represents but one of Microsoft’s oil and gas undertakings.129
Microsoft’s rationale is also misleading—or perhaps is a form of
self-interested cheerleading—in respect of the potential of technological
innovation to reconcile continued fossil-fuel production and ambitious,
science-based climate targets. Nowhere is this more apparent than in
the Canadian oil sands, where Microsoft is also active. In the Canadian
oil sands, the use of technology has reduced per-barrel GHG emissions
intensity, but not by enough to offset absolute increases in in situ
production and upgrading emissions.130 Two decades into the twenty-first
century, while Canadian oil sands producers have access to a number
of ready-to-deploy technologies capable of marginally reducing the
emissions intensity of its products, “the pathway to carbon-neutral—or
carbon negative—oil is still unclear.”131 There is accordingly a growing
gap between rising oil sands emissions—the largest and fastest-growing
source of GHG emissions in Canada—and Canada’s climate commitments
under the Paris Agreement.132 The decarbonization of Canada, not yet

127. Microsoft, “ExxonMobil to Increase Permian Profitability Through Digital Partnership with
Microsoft” (22 February 2019), online: https://news.microsoft.com/2019/02/22/exxonmobil-toincrease-permian-profitability-through-digital-partnership-with-microsoft/.
128. Greenpeace, “Oil in the Cloud,” supra note 115.
129. Ibid.
130. Bora Plumptre, “National Emissions Numbers Underscore Need to Invest in Clean Economy:
What the Newest National Inventory Report tells us about Canada’s Growing Carbon Emissions” (23
April 2020), Pembina Institute online (blog): <www.pembina.org/blog/national-emissions-numbersunderscore-need-invest-clean-economy> [perma.cc/XM36-Z9S6].
131. Benjamin Israel et al, The Oilsands in a Carbon-Constrained Canada: The Collision Course
Between Overall Emissions and National Climate Commitments (Calgary, AB: Pembina Institute,
2020) at 42, online: <www.pembina.org/pub/oilsands-carbon-constrained-canada> [perma.cc/925DBV7P].
132. Plumptre, supra note 130.
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begun, still has a long way to go.133 This further illustrates the lack of
transparency—and accountability—of Microsoft’s net-zero pledge.
Unsurprisingly, Microsoft’s ostensibly ambitious pledge has yet to reduce
emissions. Microsoft’s emissions increased by 21.5 per cent as of June
2021, including an increase of 23 per cent in its Scope 3 emissions, which
are 50 times as large as its Scope 1 and Scope 2 emissions combined, even
after excluding the emissions emanating from its oil and gas joint ventures
from its accounting of its Scope 3 emissions.134
The recent net-zero emissions pledge made by one of Microsoft’s
major oil and gas joint-venture partners, ExxonMobil, further calls
into question the emergence of radical transparency at the core of the
science-business-society interface described by the corporate biosphere
stewardship proposal. ExxonMobil’s net-zero plan appears ambitious
insofar as it commits to absolute reductions in the firm’s carbon emissions,
a commitment it had previously refused to make in favour of far weaker
commitments to reduce its relative emissions intensity (e.g. a reduction of
emissions per barrel, which does not necessarily entail a reduction in overall
absolute emissions if oil production increases).135 However, ExxonMobil’s
new, net-zero emissions climate plan covers only emissions emanating
from the firm’s own operations and energy use (i.e. its Scope 1 and Scope
2 emissions).136 ExxonMobil and other oil and gas companies argue that
the manufacturers and drivers of petrol-burning cars, for example, should
share more of the responsibility for ExxonMobil’s and other oil and gas
producers’ Scope 3 emissions.137 As The Economist notes, such arguments,
“though not wholly without merit, are also self-serving: end users can
account for 80–90 per cent of the total climate-warming gases associated
133. Ibid.
134. See Peter Eavis, “Microsoft’s Pursuit of Climate Goals Runs Into Headwinds,” The New
York Times (10 March 2022), online: <www.nytimes.com/2022/03/10/business/microsoft-climatecarbon-emissions.html> [perma.cc/GAD5-MP2D]. With the release of these disappointing figures,
Microsoft announced that it would no longer do specialized work for fossil fuel companies unless
those companies have a net-zero target. However, as the brief discussion immediately below of
ExxonMobil’s net-zero target illustrates, this too is a far-from-transparent—let alone stringent—
requirement. More significantly, Microsoft’s increased Scope 3 emissions emanated from three main
sources: (1) energy used to build data centres, (2) power consumed by its suppliers, and (3) energy
expended by its consumers’ use of Microsoft devices, including its Xbox video game console. As
The New York Times observed, these data are “a reminder that robust business growth can often mean
pumping more greenhouse gases into the atmosphere.” I will return to this fundamental point in the
next section of the article.
135. The Economist, “What is ExxonMobil’s New Climate Strategy Worth” (22 January 2022), online:
<www.economist.com/business/what-is-exxonmobils-new-climate-strategy-worth/21807259>
[perma.cc/XEA7-99MX].
136. Ibid.
137. Ibid.
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with fossil fuels.138 Ignoring them in your carbon accounting seems mighty
convenient.”139 Mighty convenient, and also mighty misleading.
b. Conceptual limitations
The foregoing evidentiary gaps in respect of the corporate biosphere
stewardship proposal stem in part from the proposal’s aspirational nature;
the six features of the science-business-society interface identified by
Folke and his colleagues are better characterized as potentially emerging
rather than as presently observable.
Those gaps also result, however, from the corporate biosphere
stewardship proposal’s conceptual limitations. In particular, the corporate
biosphere stewardship proposal fails to adequately address the following
three conceptual issues: (1) transnational corporations significantly shape
the laws, regulations, and public policies to which they are subject, and, in
many important instances, from which they are exempt; (2) transnational
corporations’ business models are premised on, and directed toward,
continued growth of the global economy, which in turn is premised
on continued natural resource extraction and consumption as well as
material production and transport; and (3) transnational corporations are
heterogeneous, not homogeneous, and internally complex, not coherent.
Below I discuss each of these conceptual issues in turn.
III. Transnational corporate capture of public policy and regulations
The corporate biosphere stewardship proposal, like most calls for nonstate
climate leadership,140 depends on “effective public policy and improved
governmental regulations.”141 This rather understated premise overlooks
the fact that transnational corporations themselves play a leading role in
shaping public policy and capturing governmental regulations. Regulatory
capture by private interests is the root problem of environmental law,
and the biggest obstacle to transformative environmental law reform.142
138. Ibid. See also letter from Christina E Hoicka et al to Chrystia Freeland, Deputy Prime Minister
& Minister of Finance (19 January 2022) at 2, online: <cehoicka.lab.yorku.ca/files/2022/01/Letterfrom-Academics-re-CCUS-tax-investment-credit_January-2022-4.pdf?x98920> [perma.cc/QU3QBQUL].
139. The Economist, “What is ExxonMobil’s New Climate Strategy Worth,” supra note 135.
140. See MacLean, “Rethinking the Role of Nonstate Actors,” supra note 85 at 30-31, 41-43.
141. Folke et al, “Transnational corporations and biosphere stewardship,” supra note 1 at 1401.
142. Schneider et al, “Can Transnational Corporations Leverage Systemic Change,” supra note 89. See
also Jason MacLean, “Learning to Overcome Political Opposition to Transformative Environmental
Law” (2020) 117:15 Proc Natl Acad Sci 8243, DOI: <10.1073/pnas.1921436117>; Orach, Duit &
Schlüter, “Interest Group Competition,” supra note 45; Julian Arato, “Corporations as Lawmakers”
(2015) 56:2 Harv Intl LJ 229, online: <papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2585214>
[perma.cc/7MPD-78JL]; Jason MacLean & Chris Tollefson, “Foreign Wrongs, Corporate Rights, and
the Arc of Transnational Law” in Oonagh E Fitzgerald, ed, Corporate Citizen: New Perspectives on
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Corporate capture is so prevalent and powerful a phenomenon that it
calls into question anew the false dichotomy of public versus private
governance; the latter is an extension and continuation of the former, only
less accountable, especially under conditions of regulatory capture.143
A call for greater corporate biosphere stewardship premised upon
effective public policy and improved governmental regulations further
risks self-contradiction. If the global economy enjoyed effective public
policy and governmental regulations, there would be little need to call
for transformative corporate biosphere stewardship in the first place.
Moreover, because transnational corporations play such a significant role
in shaping and weakening the public policies, laws, and regulations to
which they are subject or exempt, we must look to sources other than
national governments for the transformation of transnational corporations
into public-minded and socially licensed biosphere stewards.
1. Continued economic growth and the business-as-usual hegemony of
“business sense”
To their credit, Folke and his colleagues acknowledge the reality of
transnational corporate dominance as a defining feature of the biosphere
crisis in the Anthropocene, and seek to redirect transnational corporate
dominance toward socio-ecological responsibility and stewardship. In
that sense, their call for scientists and transnational corporations to coproduce climate change knowledge and solutions appears constructive and
promising. However, as the brief discussion above of the climate pledges
of BlackRock, Microsoft, and ExxonMobil illustrates, their optimism
that such co-designed knowledge and solutions will “operate in line with
the SDGs, and make business sense”144 grossly underestimates the super
wicked challenge of conceptually redefining the meaning of “business
sense” in line with sustainability and resilience, as opposed to perpetual
and unsustainable global economic growth. To date, where “big brand
sustainability” has succeeded, it has succeeded only in changing “the rules
of the game (i.e. how products are produced), not the game itself (i.e. the
economic model).”145 Not surprisingly, corporate sustainability has been
the Globalized Rule of Law (Waterloo, ON: Centre for International Governance Innovation, 2020),
DOI: <10.2307/j.ctv176kttb.5>.
143. The locus classicus of this argument is Roderick A Macdonald, “Understanding Regulation by
Regulations” in Ivan Bernier & Andreé Lajoie, eds, Regulations, Crown Corporations and Administrative
Tribunals (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1985) 81, DOI: <10.3138/9781442656888-006>.
For an application of this argument to transnational corporations, see e.g. Sara L Seck, “Revisiting
Transnational Corporations and Extractive Industries: Climate Justice, Feminism, and State
Sovereignty” (2017) 26:2 Transnat’l L & Contemp Probs 383 at 404-407.
144. Folke et al, “Transnational Corporations,” supra note 1 at 1401.
145. Dauvergne & Lister, “Big Brand Sustainability,” supra note 83 at 44.
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described as an exercise in managing essentially unresolvable tensions
and paradoxes.146
The super wicked challenge of effective biosphere stewardship in the
Anthropocene, by contrast, calls for a post-growth economic model147
achieved through a “deep transformation based on a fundamental
reorientation of human values, equity, behavior, institutions, economies,
and technologies.”148 The normative, “business as usual” growth
narrative of extractivist global capitalism—what presently makes good
“business sense”—is part and parcel of the very super wicked climate
and sustainability problem that independent and rigorous socio-ecological
research must address head on. It cannot be merely a “reality check” on
proposed sustainability solutions.
2. Transnational corporations’ contradictions and complexity
Transnational corporations—BlackRock, Microsoft, ExxonMobil,
Amazon—are often discussed as if they are anthropomorphic,
homogeneous, bounded, and internally consistent entities; the corporate
biosphere stewardship proposal is no exception. However, transnational
corporations vary widely in terms of industry affiliation, competitive
strategy, and internal complexity.149 Dror Etzion offers two useful examples
relevant to corporate biosphere stewardship. The first concerns conflicts
within corporate supply and value chains. For example, some retail
restaurants, including some fast-food outlets, have shown an interest in
promoting plant-based alternatives to meat products. But meat processors,
who are situated farther upstream in the value chain, tend to resist this shift
in an attempt to position animal meat as a non-substitutable product. The
conflict is not only ideological, but also financial; according to Etzion,
food retailers have lower substitution costs than meat processors.150
Etzion also cites as an illustration of transnational corporations’
heterogeneity and internal inconsistency major automobile manufacturers.
Car manufacturers appeared divided over the US Environmental
Protection Agency’s decisions in 2020 to weaken Obama-era fuel
146. Etzion, “Corporate Engagement,” supra note 89 at 493. See also Jonathan Schad & Pratima
Bansal, “Seeing the Forest and the Trees: How a Systems Approach Informs Paradox Research”
(2018) 55 J Manag Stud 1490, DOI: <10.1111/joms.12398>.
147. Schneider et al, “Can Transnational Corporations Leverage Systemic Change,” supra note 89;
Jennifer B Hinton, “Fit for Purpose? Clarifying the Critical Role of Profit for Sustainability” (2020)
27:1 Journal of Political Ecology 236, DOI: <10.2458/v27i1.23502>.
148. Will Steffen et al, “Trajectories of the Earth System in the Anthropocene” (2018) 115:33 Proc
Natl Acad Sci 8252 at 8258.
149. Etzion, “Corporate Engagement,” supra note 89.
150. Ibid. This conflict does not appear to occur, however, in vertically integrated industries and
corporations.
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economy and GHG standards for passenger cars and light trucks, and
to revoke California’s authority to establish stricter tailpipe emissions
standards than those set by the federal government.151 The Alliance for
Automotive Innovation, which represents major manufacturers such as
General Motors and Toyota, supported the regulatory rollback, whereas
Ford, Honda, BMW, and Volkswagen each expressed support for the
stricter state-level regulations.152 Moreover, as Etzion observes, there
appear to be inconsistencies not only between car manufacturers, but also
within them. Many car manufacturers, for example, are simultaneously
manufacturing electric vehicles and lobbying in favour of less stringent
regulatory standards for vehicle emissions.153
Scholarship on transnational corporations is paying increasing
attention to the constitutive relationships within those firms as well as to
those firms’ permeable boundaries, including their reciprocal relationships
with socio-ecological systems. Just as relational approaches to law and
governance seek to shift analytic focus away from the paradigmatic—but
in practice elusive—bounded, autonomous, and rational agent, be it an
individual or even a political state,154 relational analysis can also shine
a light on the agency and accountability of corporations’ constituent
members. Attending to transnational corporations’ internal complexity
and contradictions can also open up potential pathways, as Etzion puts
it, to “encouraging, incentivizing or coercing” transnational corporations
toward biosphere stewardship.155
Before pursuing this relational approach further in Part IV below,
however, it is important to acknowledge that the significant evidentiary
gaps and conceptual limitations of the corporate biosphere stewardship
proposal further illustrate the super wicked complexity of climate change,
as discussed earlier in this article. The limits of the corporate biosphere

151. See Hiroko Tabuchi, “States Sue to Block Trump from Weakening Fuel Economy Rules,”
The New York Times (27 May 2020), online: <www.nytimes.com/2020/05/27/climate/lawsuit-fueleconomy-climate.html> [perma.cc/58FF-ZMFG].
152. Ibid. As of this writing, General Motors has changed its position, and now ostensibly supports
stricter standards. Coral Davenport, “G.M. Drops Its Support for Trump Climate Rollbacks, and Aligns
With Biden,” The New York Times (23 November 2020), online: <www.nytimes.com/2020/11/23/
climate/general-motors-trump.html> [perma.cc/2TPN-GGTM]. Further to this point, it bears
reiterating that three of 25 of the world’s large companies that have committed to net-zero GHG
emissions—Deutsche Telekom, Maersk, and Vodaphone—appear to have genuinely committed to
deep decarbonization of over 90 per cent of their full value chain emissions by their respective netzero-target years: Day et al, supra note 5 at 5.
153. Etzion, “Corporate Engagement,” supra note 89.
154. See e.g. Seck, “Relational Law,” supra note 55 at 160. See also Karen Knop, “Re/Statements:
Feminism and State Sovereignty in International Law” (1993) 3:2 Transnat’l L & Contemp Probs 293.
155. Etzion, “Corporate Engagement,” supra note 89 at 493.
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approach also throw into relief the implications of characterizing climate
change as a super wicked problem for how we conceive of potential
responses. Does the super wicked complexity of climate change lend itself
more to the collaborative co-production approach proposed by Folke and
his colleagues (i.e. what Cashore and Bernstein categorize as the Type 3
collaboration-and-compromise approach to environmental governance),
or the strategy of conflict alluded to both by Etzion as well as Cashore and
Bernstein, who suggest—without spelling out how—strategic conflict may
advance Type 4 responses to the climate crisis? Or do the limitations of the
corporate biosphere proposal and, more generally, the science-businesssociety interface, gesture toward an even more fundamental reckoning
for climate governance? In the next part of this article, I address these
questions through a case study of the Amazon Employees for Climate
Justice’s strategic opposition to Amazon.com’s net-zero climate pledge.
IV. Case study: Amazon Employees for Climate Justice’s opposition to
Amazon.com’s net-zero climate pledge
In April 2019 a group of 8,702 employees of Amazon.com, Inc.156
published an “Open letter to Jeff Bezos and the Amazon Board of
Directors”157 urging the company to assert leadership on climate change.
These employees—styling themselves as the “Amazon Employees for
Climate Justice”—began their letter to the company’s CEO and Board
of Directors by seeking to rewrite the company’s signature focus and
strength: “Our customer obsession requires climate obsession.”158 Amazon,
the open letter continued, “understands the importance of thinking big,
taking ownership of hard problems, and earning trust. These traits have
made Amazon a top global innovator but have been missing from the
company’s approach to climate change.”159 The letter was premised upon
the employees’ view that “it’s our responsibility to ensure our business
models don’t contribute to the climate crisis.”160

156. Amazon.com, Inc. (Amazon) is a public company incorporated in the US State of Delaware. Its
common stock is listed on the NASDAQ Global Select Market. In the United States, Amazon directly
employs more than 275,000 people, and indirectly through its investments approximately 680,000
additional people. Its founder and CEO is Jeff Bezos. See Amazon.com, Inc., “About Amazon,”
online: <web.archive.org/web/20200709163314/https://www.aboutamazon.com/our-company/aboutamazon> [perma.cc/8VBA-SA78].
157. Letter from Amazon Employees for Climate Justice to Jeff Bezos and the Amazon Board of
Directors (10 April 2019), online: Medium <medium.com/@amazonemployeesclimatejustice/publicletter-to-jeff-bezos-and-the-amazon-board-of-directors-82a8405f5e38> [perma.cc/7BPX-X3V9].
158. Ibid.
159. Ibid.
160. Ibid.
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Following a critique of Amazon’s sustainability policies as lacking
internal consistency and comparative context, the Amazon Employees for
Climate Justice recommended a company-wide climate plan based on the
following six principles:
(1) Public goals and timelines consistent with science and the UN
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s (IPCC) 2018 special
report on 1.5 degrees Celsius global warming;
(2) A complete and direct transition away from fossil fuels rather than
relying on indirect pollution abatement in the form of carbon offsets;
(3) Prioritizing climate impacts when making business decisions,
notably including the cancellation of all custom cloud computing
services through its Amazon Web Services division specifically
designed to facilitate oil and gas exploration and extraction;
(4) Prioritizing the reduction of harm to the world’s most vulnerable
communities, including Black, Indigenous, and other communities of
colour, particularly in the Global South;
(5) Advocacy on behalf of local, federal, and international
policies that reduce overall GHG emissions in line with the IPCC’s
recommendations, and withholding support from policymakers who
seek to delay climate action; and
(6) Fair treatment of all employees during climate disruptions and
extreme weather events.161
The Amazon Employees for Climate Justice concluded their open letter by
linking Amazon’s core strengths with its potential for climate leadership:
“Amazon has the resources and scale to spark the world’s imagination and
redefine what is possible and necessary to address the climate crisis.”162
The Amazon Employees for Climate Justice further expressed these
recommendations in the form of a shareholder resolution during Amazon’s
annual shareholder meeting in May 2019.163 Amazon’s Board recommended
that its shareholders, a majority of whom are large, institutional investors,
reject the resolution.164 The resolution failed, receiving approximately 30
per cent of shareholder votes.165
161. Ibid.
162. Ibid.
163. See Eugene Kim & Paayal Zaveri, “Amazon’s shareholder meeting turns testy as investors
demand action on climate crisis and diversity,” CNBC (22 May 2019), online: <www.cnbc.
com/2019/05/22/amazon-2019-shareholder-meeting-turns-testy.html> [perma.cc/4UX5-YRDC].
164. See Heather Clancy, “3 Takeaways from that Failed Amazon Employee Shareholder Resolution
on the Climate Crisis,” GreenBiz (24 May 2019), online: <www.greenbiz.com/article/3-takeawaysfailed-amazon-employee-shareholder-resolution-climate-crisis> [perma.cc/5HYK-QLK9].
165. See Todd Bishop, “Amazon Shareholders Proposals on Climate and Facial Recognition Won
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Amazon did respond, however, if not directly, to its employees’ demand
for an enhanced climate plan. In September 2019, Amazon announced a
new plan by co-founding with the ENGO “Global Optimism” an initiative
called “The Climate Pledge” to meet the goals of the Paris Agreement by
2040.166 Amazon specifically committed to (1) become “net zero carbon”
by 2040, (2) power its operations using 100 per cent renewable energy
by 2030, (3) order 100,000 electric fleet vehicles by 2030, (4) invest
US$100 million in reforestation projects around the world, and (5) launch
a sustainability website to report progress on its commitments.167
However, in September 2019 Amazon also adopted a new internal
corporate policy prohibiting its employees from speaking publicly about
the company without management approval.168 Nevertheless, 357 Amazon
Employees for Climate Justice publicly criticized Amazon’s new Climate
Pledge. Specifically, these employees argued that Amazon’s climate plan
should be more ambitious and urgent by committing to carbon neutrality
by 2030, not 2040.169 They further argued that Amazon’s Climate Pledge is
internally inconsistent, contrary to climate science, and jeopardized by its
ongoing commitment— through its Amazon Web Services division—to
collaborating with fossil fuel producers to expedite oil and gas exploration
and extraction through its cloud computing services.170 Finally, the
Amazon Employees for Climate Justice, in conjunction with the Center
for Community Action and Environmental Justice (an ENGO), argued
that Amazon’s GHG emissions disproportionately harm communities of
colour.171 At Amazon’s annual shareholder meeting in May 2020, the group
presented a resolution relating to environmental racism, calling attention
to the ways in which the company’s operations disproportionately harm
communities of colour, including the health impacts of diesel emissions
about 30 Percent of the Vote,” GeekWire (24 May 2019), online: <www.geekwire.com/2019/amazonshareholders-proposals-climate-facial-recognition-won-30-percent-vote/> [perma.cc/EVF8-QH47].
166. “Amazon Co-founds The Climate Pledge, Setting Goal to Meet the Paris Agreement 10
Years Early,” Business Wire (19 September 2019), online: <www.businesswire.com/news/
home/20190919005609/en/> [perma.cc/78GM-8RKW]. For more information about “Global
Optimism,” an ENGO specifically focused on corporate sector collaboration, see Global Optimism,
online: <www.globaloptimism.com/why-stubborn-optimism> [perma.cc/565F-A9UU].
167. Ibid.
168. Isobel Asher Hamilton, “‘Great for the Bottom Line but Awful for Society’: 350 Amazon
Workers Slammed its Climate Policies in Defiance of a Crackdown on Dissent,” Business Insider
(27 January 2020), online: <www.businessinsider.com/357-amazon-employees-slammed-companyclimate-record-2020-1> [perma.cc/Z3SE-T24H].
169. Ibid.
170. Ibid.
171. Amazon Employees for Climate Justice, “How Amazon’s Emissions are Hurting Communities
of Color,” Medium (26 May 2020), online: <medium.com/@amazonemployeesclimatejustice/
environmental-justice-and-amazons-carbon-footprint-9e10fab21138> [perma.cc/CU3U-D59K].
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from its fleet vehicles operating at its warehouses, which tend (in the
United States) to be concentrated in Black and Latinx communities. The
company’s Climate Pledge commitment to purchase 100,000 electric
vehicles by 2030 is misleading in this regard because those vehicles
will only be used for last-mile delivery to customers’ doors and will not
improve air pollution near the company’s distribution hubs.172
The latter complaint, coupled with expressions of concerns about
the safety of Amazon warehouses during the outbreak of the COVID-19
pandemic in the spring of 2020, culminated in Amazon dismissing a
number of its employees, including visible leaders of Amazon Employees
for Climate Justice, for violating its public communications policy. In
response, Tim Bray, a “VP and Distinguished Engineer at Amazon Web
Services,” resigned in protest, describing Amazon’s decision to fire the
whistleblowers in retaliation for their activism173 and following through on
the company’s earlier threat to its employees.174
In France, a similar story unfolded, albeit within a notably different
political and regulatory context. There its workers’ unions successfully
challenged Amazon in court, and the Versailles Court of Appeals upheld
a lower court ruling ordering Amazon to temporarily cease delivery of
nonessential items until it carried out in consultation with its workers’
unions a comprehensive risk assessment of its warehouses to ensure
their safety.175 Not all of Amazon’s French workers supported the
lawsuit—approximately 15,000 signed a petition urging the reopening of
warehouses.176 However, even after accounting for France’s storied history
of worker protest and relatively pro-employee labour and corporate
laws,177 it was the French workers’ coalition building and public advocacy
172. Amazon Employees for Climate Justice, “How Amazon’s Emissions are Hurting Communities
of Color,” Medium (26 May 2020), online: <https://amazonemployees4climatejustice.medium.com/
environmental-justice-and-amazons-carbon-footprint-9e10fab21138>.
173. Tim Bray, “Bye, Amazon” (29 April 2020), online (blog): Ongoing <www.tbray.org/ongoing/
When/202x/2020/04/29/Leaving-Amazon> [perma.cc/FCH7-2YSW]. For reporting on Amazon’s
warehouse conditions, see Karen Weise & Kate Conger, “Gaps in Amazon’s Response as Virus
Spreads to More Than 50 Warehouses,” The New York Times (5 April 2020), online: <www.nytimes.
com/2020/04/05/technology/coronavirus-amazon-workers.html> [perma.cc/G3MR-MP8B].
174. See Oliver Milman, “Amazon Threatened to Fire Employees for Speaking out on Climate,
Workers Say,” The Guardian (2 January 2020), online: <www.theguardian.com/technology/2020/
jan/02/amazon-threatened-fire-employees-speaking-out-climate-change-workers-say>
[perma.
cc/6EFC-R7N3]. The National Labor Relations Board subsequently found that these dismissals
amounted to illegal retaliation, resulting in a settlement in 2021. See Evans, supra note 8.
175. See Liz Alderman, “Amazon Loses Appeal of French Order to Stop Selling Nonessential Items,”
The New York Times (24 April 2020), online: <www.nytimes.com/2020/04/24/business/amazonfrance-unions-coronavirus.html> [https://perma.cc/6GU4-MZL8].
176. Ibid.
177. See Cole Stangler, “How French Workers Took on Amazon in the Middle of a Pandemic and
Won,” The New York Times (29 April 2020), online: <www.nytimes.com/2020/04/29/opinion/amazon-
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that resulted in Amazon implementing health and safety improvements
that the company was otherwise unprepared to make. Strategic conflict
succeeded, at least in the short term.
This result, in turn, is similar to Amazon’s initial response to the
Amazon Employees for Climate Justice’s demands for an enhanced
company-wide climate plan. To understand the similarity, however, it is
necessary to first assess Amazon’s Climate Pledge, which, not unlike the
climate commitments of BlackRock, Microsoft, and ExxonMobil discussed
above, does not meet the criteria of corporate biosphere stewardship—
it is neither radically transparent nor ecologically coherent. Amazon’s
“Shipment Zero” commitment, for example, extends from its warehouses
to its customers’ doors.178 While achieving net-zero GHG emissions during
this leg of its operations will be important, the commitment excludes
the remaining Scope 3 emissions embedded in Amazon’s supply chain
associated with the production and delivery of non-Amazon products to
its warehouses.179 Amazon calculates its GHG emissions by estimating the
emissions that arise from sources that are within its “system boundary,”
including:
– Amazon’s last-mile delivery fleet;
–

Amazon-operated freight, including trucks and airplanes;

–

Purchased delivery services (e.g. postal services) and other
contracted freight;

–

Electricity in its fulfillment centres, data centres, physical stores,
and other facilities;

–

Amazon packaging;

france-coronavirus.html> [perma.cc/94QU-A7E4]. As noted earlier, in 2017, France enacted the
French Corporate Duty of Vigilance, which creates for companies with more than 5,000 employees
in France (or more than 10,000 globally) a legal duty to identify and prevent environmental harms
and human rights violations in its activities and the activities of its subsidiaries, subcontractors, and
suppliers. See Sandra Cossart, Jérôme Chaplier & Tiphanie Beau de Lomenie, “The French Law on
Duty of Care: A Historic Step Towards Making Globalization Work for All” (2017) 2:2 Bus & Human
Rights J 317, DOI: <10.1017/bhj.2017.14>.
178. “Delivering Shipment Zero” (version from 21 April 2020), online: Amazon <web.archive.org/
web/20200421013327/https://sustainability.aboutamazon.com/delivering-shipment-zero>
[perma.
cc/8BRA-WBJK].
179. This is difficult to ascertain definitively; Amazon’s accounting of its “other indirect emissions”
is not radically transparent. For 2018, Amazon disclosed that its “other indirect emissions” from, for
example, “third-party transportation, packaging, upstream energy related” amounted to 13.89 million
metric tonnes CO2e. Absent additional information, this figure is difficult to assess, which undermines
the accountability of Amazon’s Climate Pledge. See “Our Carbon Footprint” (last visited 26 August
2022), online: Amazon <sustainability.aboutamazon.com/environment/carbon-footprint> [perma.
cc/7W4T-G92T] [Amazon, “Carbon Footprint”].
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–

Amazon product manufacturing (e.g. Kindle e-readers);

–

Amazon customers’ use of Amazon devices;

–

Capital goods, such as emissions from building construction,
manufacturing of servers and equipment, and the production of
other Amazon infrastructure;

–

Corporate operating expenses, such as business travel, office
supplies, corporate events, and outside consulting services;

–

Customers’ trips to Amazon’s physical stores (e.g. Whole Foods
Market); and

–

Refrigerants used for cooling in data centres, corporate offices,
grocery stores, and fulfillment centres.180

The foregoing list is extensive, and covers most of Amazon’s Scope
1 and Scope 2 GHG emissions. And those emissions are high. In 2018,
the GHG emissions from within Amazon’s “system boundary” amounted
to 44.4 million metric tonnes of CO2e,181 approximately equivalent to the
annual GHG emissions of Norway.182 Amazon’s reported GHG emissions
increased by 36 per cent between 2018 and 2020.183
High as Amazon’s reported GHG emissions are, its true total emissions
are far higher. Amazon’s carbon accounting expressly excludes the
majority of its Scope 3 emissions, including the emissions associated with
the sourcing, manufacturing, distribution, and end-use of non-Amazon
products shipped to and from its distribution centres.
For example, Amazon’s Scope 3 emissions should also include the
emissions arising from the production, distribution, and use of the products
that it buys from manufacturers and sells directly to its consumers, but
Amazon excludes these emissions from its carbon accounting and its netzero pledge. Yet Amazon still labels and advertises many such products as
“Climate Pledge Friendly” (see Fig. 3, below).184

180. “Reaching Net Zero Carbon by 2040: Measuring, Mapping, and Reducing Carbon the Amazonian
Way” (last visited 26 August 2022) at 2-3, online (pdf): Amazon <sustainability.aboutamazon.com/
carbon-methodology.pdf>[perma.cc/6TQ7-NPYP].
181. Amazon, “Carbon Footprint,” supra note 179.
182. In 2018, Norway’s GHG emissions were 52.9 million metric tonnes of CO2e. Sveinung Sleire,
“Norway Greenhouse Gas Emissions Rise Despite Renewable Push,” Bloomberg (3 June 2019),
online:
<www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-06-03/norway-greenhouse-gas-emissions-risedespite-renewable-push#xj4y7vzkg> [perma.cc/65TB-54DU].
183. Evans, supra note 8. See also Day et al, supra note 5 at 54. In 2020, Amazon reported emissions
of 60.6 MtCO2e, a 36 per cent increase over its 2018 emissions of 44.4 MtCO2e.
184. Ibid.
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Fig. 3. “Climate Pledge Friendly”185

This practice violates the carbon accounting principles of the
Greenhouse Gas Protocol, which stipulates that retail companies account
for the emissions associated with all of the products that they sell to
consumers, and not solely those emissions emanating from retailers’ own
brands.186
These omissions are on top of Amazon’s omission of the direct,
upstream, and downstream GHG emissions associated with the oil and gas
exploration and extraction facilitated by Amazon Web Services, which are
inexplicably excluded from Amazon’s carbon accounting. Each of these
exclusions renders Amazon’s 2030 and 2040 emissions-reduction targets
materially misleading, if not meaningless, from the perspective of climate
science.
Yet Amazon, like other “big brands” publicly committed to
sustainability and climate action (e.g. Walmart, as discussed briefly above),
otherwise wields significant influence over its product suppliers.187 It has
185. Credit: Amazon.com screen shot (11 March 2022). I owe this particular observation to Evans,
supra note 8.
186. World Resources Institute & World Business Council for Sustainable Development, Corporate
Value Chain (Scope 3) Accounting and Reporting Standard: Supplement to the GHG Protocol
Corporate Accounting and Reporting Standard (2011) at 28-40, online (pdf): Greenhouse Gas Protocol
<ghgprotocol.org/sites/default/files/standards/Corporate-Value-Chain-Accounting-ReporingStandard_041613_2.pdf> [perma.cc/3S5M-Y57C]. This is not an isolated accounting oversight. With
three times the number of employees than its rival firm Target, for example, Amazon nonetheless
reported employee commuting emissions – an element of its Scope 3 emissions—that were 29 per cent
lower. How to explain this apparent discrepancy? While firms like Target, Home Depot, and Walmart
estimate the emissions arising from their employees’ commutes to and from work, Amazon accounts
only for those emissions emanating from its own corporate shuttles. See Evans, supra note 8.
187. At this writing, for example, the European Commission is preparing to bring antitrust charges
against Amazon for abusing its market dominance vis-à-vis third-party merchants. See Adam

508 The Dalhousie Law Journal

the market power and scale to influence deeper reductions to its Scope
3 supply chain GHG emissions. Amazon’s “Supply Chain Standards,”
however, demand little in respect of emissions reductions from its many
third-party-merchant suppliers, and merely “encourage suppliers to look
for ways to improve energy efficiency, minimize energy consumption, and
mitigate greenhouse gas emissions.”188
Nevertheless, and similar to the result achieved by Amazon’s unions in
France in relation to the public health conditions in Amazon’s warehouses,
Amazon’s Climate Pledge is inarguably an incremental improvement—if
not a radical transformation—of its climate policy prior to the formation
and advocacy of Amazon Employees for Climate Justice. These
employees’ strategic conflict with Amazon’s CEO, Board of Directors,
and institutional shareholders constitutes neither a silver bullet nor a lost
cause. As it presently stands, Amazon’s climate policy warrants something
less than simplistic cheerleading, but also something more than climate
policy cynicism and fatalism.
Amazon’s climate policy, moreover, is far from fixed in form. The
meaning of Amazon’s climate commitments, like the meaning of Amazon
itself, is an ongoing matter of discursive construction and contestation. Its
senior leadership, its shareholders, its employees, its customers, and its
regulators will continue to shape its meaning, including its climate impact.
The choices that Amazon’s constituent members make will also answer
what is perhaps the larger and more pressing question—the “nagging
doubt” underneath nearly all climate policy proposals—whether a
transnational corporation whose business model embodies “Low Prices—
Fast Shipping—Millions of Items” is consistent with, and conducive to,
ecologically coherent and publicly accountable biosphere stewardship.
Might the strategic conflict pursued by the Amazon Employees for Climate
Justice be merely a Type 3 compromise —one that seeks to change how the
game is played but not the game itself—masquerading as a transformative
Type 4 solution?
This question comes into sharp relief in the context of Amazon’s netzero climate pledge, and the Amazon Employees for Climate Justice’s
demand that Amazon adopt a company-wide climate plan consistent
with the goals and timelines of climate science. What exactly does that
Satariano, “Amazon Set to Face Antitrust Charges in the European Union,” The New York Times (11
June 2020), online: <www.nytimes.com/2020/06/11/technology/amazon-antitrust-european-union.
html> [perma.cc/R8J4-58KZ].
188. “Amazon Supply Chain Standards” (last visited 26 August 2022) at 4-5, online (pdf): Amazon
<sustainability.aboutamazon.com/amazon-supply-chain-standards-english.pdf>
[perma.cc/PBW8DAPH].
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demand mean? Since the onset of the Amazon Employees’ conflict with
their employer, the climate policy and governance implications of net-zero
GHG emissions have become considerably clearer.
Climate researchers have identified a series of attributes of credible
net-zero emissions plans: (1) front-loaded emissions reductions (reducing
emissions as much and as fast as possible);189 (2) a comprehensive approach
to emissions reductions (addressing all GHG emissions);190 (3) cautious
use of carbon dioxide removals (a combination of a very low level of
residual emissions with low levels of multi-decadal removals of residual
emissions from the atmosphere);191 (4) effective regulation of carbon
offsets (transparent standards and effective verification and accounting
practices);192 (5) an equitable transition to net zero (acknowledging
common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capacities
(CBDR-RC));193 (6) alignment with socio-ecological objectives (net-zero
plans should be integrated into broader strategies for protecting ecosystem
services and socio-ecological sustainability);194 and (7) interim milestones
and implementation measures (detailed plans, including monitoring
measures to review progress and revise as needed).195
Amazon’s net-zero climate pledge does not meet these criteria.
Amazon’s emissions are rising, not falling. Moreover, the majority of
its emissions are Scope 3 emissions, and Amazon’s net-zero plan does
not credibly measure its Scope 3 emissions, let alone specify how those
emissions will be reduced. Accordingly, its plan does not front-load
emissions reductions.
Nor does Amazon’s plan clearly cover all GHG emissions; Amazon
does not clarify whether its net-zero target covers all GHG emissions, or
only carbon emissions.
While Amazon’s net-zero pledge remains unsubstantiated without any
explicit emissions-reduction target for its own emissions, it envisages a
significant—as opposed to cautious—role for carbon offsets.196 Amazon
played a major role in mobilizing financing for the Lowering Emissions by
Accelerating Forest finance (LEAF) coalition, and since 2019 Amazon’s
US$100 million Right Now Climate Fund provides financial support for
189. Fankhauser at al, supra note 4 at 17. See also Joeri Rogelj et al, “Comment: Three Ways to
Improve Net-Zero Emissions Targets” (2021) 591 Nature 365 [Rogelj et al, “Net-Zero”].
190. Fankhauser at al, supra note 4 at 17; Rogelj et al, “Net-Zero,” supra note 189 at 366.
191. Fankhauser at al, supra note 4 at 17; Joppa et al, supra note 126 at 630.
192. Fankhauser at al, supra note 4 at 18; Joppa et al, supra note 126 at 630-631.
193. Fankhauser at al, supra note 4 at 18-19; Rogelj et al, “Net-Zero,” supra note 189 at 367-368.
194. Fankhauser at al, supra note 4 at 19; Joppa et al, supra note 126 at 632.
195. Rogelj et al, “Net-Zero,” supra note 189 at 368.
196. Day et al, supra note 5 at 54-55.
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the immediate implementation of nature-based carbon removals. But the
significant uncertainty regarding the additionality and permanence of
carbon dioxide removal projects means that such projects should not be
used as credits in support of carbon-neutrality claims.197
The ineffectiveness of Amazon’s net-zero plan underscores its lack
of equity. Would the global climate goal of the Paris Agreement be
achieved if everyone addressed their emissions in the way that Amazon
does? Plainly not. How will Amazon’s target affect others’ capacity to
achieve net zero, and their pursuit of the other Sustainable Development
Goals? Amazon’s failure to rapidly and steeply reduce its own emissions
necessarily imposes a larger burden on others—including those with far
less capacity than Amazon—to reduce their emissions.
Amazon’s investments in nature-based climate solutions may,
depending on the implementation of those solutions, support broader socioecological protection efforts. But given the lack of comprehensiveness
and transparency of Amazon’s net-zero plan, it is not presently possible to
assess its operations’ net contribution to the protection and restoration of
ecosystem services and socio-ecological sustainability.
Finally, Amazon’s net-zero plan does not include any interim GHGemission-reduction targets. Moreover, its plans to offset its residual,
unabated emissions by 2040 do not specify any specific initiatives or
milestones. The overall low granularity of Amazon’s emissions data poses
a further obstacle to effectively monitoring progress toward its target and
revising its plan as necessary.198
The insufficiency of Amazon’s net-zero climate pledge raises a
question—indeed a challenge—even more fundamental than the Amazon
Employees for Climate Justice’s demand that their employer adopt a
company-wide climate plan consistent with the climate science of netzero emissions, namely:
If Amazon were counting its footprint like some of its competition, it
would have to get rid of millions or more tons of carbon emissions—
by radically transforming its business, forcing suppliers to change their
own operations, paying for enormous carbon offsets or maybe even
confronting whether The Climate Pledge is compatible with Amazon’s
business model after all.199

197. Ibid at 55; Joppa et al, supra note 126 at 630.
198. Day et al, supra note 5 at 54–55.
199. Evans, supra note 8 [emphasis added].
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Conclusion
In this article I have explored the role that transnational corporations play
both in causing and seeking to solve the super wicked policy problem
of climate change. By critically examining a notable proposal for
corporate biosphere stewardship, I have also reflected on the predominant
approaches to specifying the relationship between how the problem of
climate change is defined and the types of policy and governance solutions
to climate change that scholars and advocates propose. A case study of the
Amazon Employees for Climate Justice’s strategic opposition to Amazon.
com’s net-zero climate pledge simultaneously supports and calls into
question an emerging approach to specifying climate change solutions
based on normative and scientific imperatives and prioritizing strategic
conflict over multistakeholder collaboration and compromise. This case
study raises a larger, more fundamental question about the potentially
irreconcilable incompatibility of transnational corporate business models,
perpetual economic growth, and sustainability that merits further research
and reflection.
The “nagging doubt” underneath the prevailing presumption of the
complementarity of continuous economic growth and climate protection200
grew larger during the global coronavirus pandemic in the spring of
2020. In a widely shared online essay published in the early stages of the
COVID-19 lockdowns, the French philosopher of science Bruno Latour
expressed this larger doubt by way of an otherwise banal anecdote:
a Dutch florist was on television the other day, weeping because he
had to trash tonnes of tulips that we[re] ready for shipping. Without
customers, he couldn’t air-freight them around the world. Of course,
we cannot but feel for him; and it is right he is recompensed. But then
the camera tracked back onto the tulips he was growing without soil
under artificial light before sending them off from Schiphol airport, on
air-freighters with kerosene raining down, which makes one wonder: ‘Is
it really useful to prolong this way of producing and selling these types
of flowers?’201

Broadening his point, Latour argued that injustice “is not just about the
redistribution of the fruits of progress, but about the very manner in which
the planet is made fruitful.”202
200. Meckling & Allan, supra note 41 at 437.
201. Bruno Latour, “What protective measures can you think of so we don’t go back to the pre-crisis
production model?,” translated from French by Stephen Muecke, AOC (29 March 2020) at 2, online
(pdf): <www.bruno-latour.fr/sites/default/files/downloads/P-202-AOC-ENGLISH_1.pdf> [perma.cc/
W4LU-3E7T].
202. Ibid at 3 [emphasis in original].
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In a subsequent essay, Latour elaborated on the “fundamental doubt”
precipitated by the COVID-19 pandemic in the broader context of climate
change:
People in lockdown would have been cautious about infection, but
would not have set about discussing whether it was really useful to
produce aeroplanes, to continue cruising on giant ships that look like
container vessels, or to expect Argentina to provide the soya required
for Breton pigs. The new climatic regime, when superimposed upon the
health crisis, casts such fundamental doubt upon the whole question of
production that it took only two months of lockdown for the issue to be
reinvigorated.203

In response to the economic recession precipitated by COVID-19,
governments spent unprecedented amounts to restart the economy. In
2020 and 2021, the G20 group of the world’s largest economies spent
approximately US$ 14 trillion to boost health-care systems, wages, and
welfare.204 These domestic spending packages also promised climate action
under the banners of “green new deals” and “building back better.”205
But as Latour warned, we may just as quickly forget this fundamental
doubt about economic production, turn our backs on the broad and
inclusive reflection on the transformative potential of a political ecology,
and return to the narrower and exclusive pre-crisis preoccupation with the
growth of the global economy.206
An analysis of G20 governments’ stimulus spending bears out
Latour’s warning. At this writing, only six per cent of the G20’s aggregate
stimulus spending has been allocated to policies that might reduce GHG
emissions, a significant missed opportunity as G20 countries account
for more than 80 per cent of global GHG emissions.207 Meanwhile,
three per cent of the stimulus has been spent on activities—such as
subsidizing coal production—likely to increase emissions.208 Overall, the
vast majority—91 per cent—of stimulus spending was directed, not to
reducing GHG emissions, but to restoring business as usual through tax
203. Bruno Latour, “Are you ready to extract yourself from the Economy?,” translated from French
by Timothy Howles, AOC (1 June 2020) at 7, online (pdf): <www.bruno-latour.fr/sites/default/files/
downloads/P-205-ECONOMISATION-AOC-GB_1.pdf> [perma.cc/GSM6-Q6VF].
204. Jonas M Nahm, Scot M Miller & Johannes Urpelainen, “G20’s US$14-Trillion Economic
Stimulus Reneges on Emissions Pledges” (2022) 603 Nature 28, online: <www.nature.com/articles/
d41586-022-00540-6> [perma.cc/NF48-HNBG].
205. Ibid at 28.
206. Jonathan Watts, “Bruno Latour: ‘This is a global catastrophe that has come from within,’”
The Guardian (6 June 2020), online: <www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jun/06/bruno-latourcoronavirus-gaia-hypothesis-climate-crisis> [perma.cc/E832-YLKK].
207. Nahm, Miller & Urpelainen, supra note 204 at 28-29.
208. Ibid at 28.
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exemptions, subsidies, largely-strings-free business bailouts, and wages
paid to businesses and workers to avoid lay-offs.209
To put these figures into perspective, the “build back better”
investments of 2020–2021 were less than the green investments made
following the global financial crisis of 2007–2009, when 16 per cent of
global stimulus spending was directed at reducing GHG emissions.210
Thus the challenge of the Type 4 environmental governance approach
to the super wicked problem of climate change described in this article is to
resist this turn away from the growing doubts about continuous economic
growth under business-as-usual conditions raised by the normative and
scientific imperatives of climate science, and gird for conflict.
However, as the world prepares to transition—on paper, at least, and
however prematurely—from the COVID-19 pandemic to COVID-19
endemicity, the strategic conflict demanded by Type 4 environmental
governance must be an order of magnitude more strategic than the Amazon
Employees for Climate Justice’s opposition to Amazon’s net-zero climate
pledge.211 Their opposition uncritically presupposes that decarbonization
and socio-ecological sustainability are compatible, not only with Amazon’s
business model, but also a global economy within which companies like
Amazon dominate. This uncritical presumption remains predominant
within socio-ecological climate science and policy scholarship, even within
the emerging research agenda on the socio-ecological interpretation of net
zero.212 Doubtless there are a number of factors accounting for the G20’s
small investments in reducing GHG emissions—in stark contrast to their
209. Ibid at 30.
210. Ibid at 29.
211. One of this article’s peer reviewers remarked that the opposition of the Amazon Employees
for Climate Justice was rather tame in comparison with the forms of contestation—including civil
disobedience—envisaged by Extinction Rebellion. I agree: Extinction Rebellion’s strategy is at once
more critical and disruptive. I also take the point that multiple forms of conflict from multiple quarters
are emerging as a part of Type 4 governance disputes. The “Freedom Convoy” protests in Canada are a
case in point. See Krista Collier-Jarvis, “Like the truck-machines in ‘Mad Max,’ the ‘freedom convoy’
relies on access to fuel,” The Conversation (14 February 2022), online: <theconversation.com/likethe-truck-machines-in-mad-max-the-freedom-convoy-relies-on-access-to-fuel-176885> [perma.cc/
C3NY-X7TV].. A fuller discussion of the forms of conflict that will shape Type 4 governance in
response to climate change is beyond the scope of this article. The point that I want to emphasize
here is that such conflict, in order to be transformative, must be strategic in a way that leaves open a
broad space for contestation over political and policy possibilities. I owe the further development of
this particular point to my fellow participants—Benjamin J Richardson, Fenner Stewart, Konstantia
Koutouki, and Vanisha Sukdeo—in the “Climate Change and the Right to Protest” panel discussion
hosted by Osgoode Hall Law School, 20 January 2022.
212. Fankhauser at al, supra note 4 (“[i]n the longer term, zero-carbon innovation may unleash a
virtuous cycle of investment, renewal and growth” at 19); Nahm, Miller & Urpelainen, supra note
204 (“[y]et the view that emissions reductions and economic recovery are irreconcilable is incorrect”
at 31).
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commitments to the Paris Agreement—and transnational corporations’
largely empty and misleading net-zero pledges. But perhaps the most
significant and least discussed factor is the failure to date to imagine how
business-as-usual economic and environmental policy can be transformed
in such a way as to decouple economic growth not only from GHG
emissions, but also from the stocks and flows of nonrenewable natural
resources and material infrastructure on which economic growth remains
dependent.213 To put it simply, and starkly, there is presently no empirical
evidence to support the possibility of absolute decoupling between
economic growth—as measured by Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and
aggregate material use.214 Yet reduced aggregate material use is crucial
to climate change mitigation, the reduction of adverse environmental
impacts, and the prevention of biodiversity loss.215 Nor will large-scale
renewable energy deployment contribute to reduced material use, as
renewables—GHG emissions aside—actually have a higher material
footprint than fossil fuels.216 Something, be it business-as-usual economic
growth or socio-ecological sustainability, has to give. This conflict will
soon define global climate governance.
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